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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LOGAN CITY,
STATE OF UTAH,

;
Case No. 920739-CA

Plaintiff(s)-Appellee(s),
Case Type:

APPEAL

-vsPriority No. 2
LOWELL D. CARLSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a criminal judgment in the
First Circuit Court, County of Cache, State of Utah, Logan
City Department pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and U.C.A. § 77-18a-l,
(1953 as amended), and jurisdiction is invoked upon this
Court under the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(d) and
§ 78-4-11, (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Ordinance under which the defendant

was charged, Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of
Logan City violates the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of
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the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The standards of review to review this issue are as
follows:

Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's decision

on the constitutionality of the statute for correctness,
according no deference to its legal conclusions.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991);

State v.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the

prosecution's motion to amend the Information at trial for
the following reasons:
(a).

The original Information was fatally defective

in that it charged the defendant for violating an unconstitutional and invalid Ordinance and could not be cured by
amendment at trial.
(b).

The prosecution by the State of Utah was barred

under the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
(c).

The Logan City Prosecutor lacked any authority

to prosecute the defendant in the name of the State of Utah.
(d).

The substantial rights of the defendant were
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prejudiced by the amendments.
The standards of review to review these issues are
as follows:

To determine nature of trial court's ruling,

Court of Appeals looks at substance of ruling rather than
label attached to it by the trial court.
806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

State v. Workman,
On appeal,

Court of Appeals accords trial court's conclusions of law
no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness
and is free to render its independent interpretation.
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986);
and Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
3.

Whether the statute under which the defendant was

convicted, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clauses
under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The standards of review to review this issue are as
follows:

Court of Appeals is to construe statutes and

ordinances so as to carry out legislative intent while
avoiding constitutional defects.
754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988).

In re Criminal Investigations,

Court of Appeals will not

rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order to
reach a constitutional construction.

Provo City Corp., v.

Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989).
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4.

Whether the evidence adduced at trial was in-

sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction.
The standards of review to review this issue are
as follows:

In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the

evidence, Court of Appeals will review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.

Court of Appeals

will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence so viewed is sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he [or she] was convicted.

State v.

Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); and State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983).
5.

Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

impose sentence because of an unreasonable delay between
trial and sentencing.
The standards of review to review this issue are as
follows:

To determine nature of trial court's ruling, Court

of Appeals looks at substance of ruling rather than label
attached to it by the trial court.
1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

State v. Workman, 806 P.2d

On appeal, Court of Appeals

accords trial court!s conclusions of law no particular de-
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ference, but reviews them for correctness and is free
to render its independent interpretation.

Faulkner v.

Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); and Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1970 (Utah 1985).

Court of

Appeals will review the sufficiency of the trial courtfs
findings of fact for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of
Logan City. (See addendum)
Section 1.16.010 of the Revised Ordinances of
Logan City. (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 76-2-101, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 76-2-102, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 76-2-303, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 76-2-304, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 10-3-928, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
U.C.A. § 78-7-25, (1953 as amended). (See addendum)
Rule 4.(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(See addendum)
Rule 22.(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(See addendum)
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(See addendum)
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Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution. (See
addendum).
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
addendum).

(See

Article I, § 18 of the Utah Constitution. (See
addendum).
Article VIII, § 16 of the Utah Constitution.
(See addendum).
Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. (See
addendum).
Article I, § 9 & § 10 of the United States Constitution. (See addendum).
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. (See addendum).
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(See addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from defendant's criminal conviction for the offense of Selling Tobacco Products to a
person under age nineteen in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104,
(1953 as amended).
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The defendant was tried in a jury trial held in the
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First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of Cache,
Logan City Department on the 16th day of January, 1992.
Defense counsel after the jury was impanelled and sworn
moved the trial court for dismissal of the Information filed
in the case of Logan City v. Lowell D. Carlsen on grounds
that the penalty for violating the ordinance under which
defendant was charged conflicted with the penalty for an
identical offense under State statute, Allqood v. Larson,
545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976).

The Logan City Prosecutor, Scott

L. Wyatt then moved the court to amend the Information changing the name of the prosecuting party from Logan City to the
State of Utah, from a charge of violating a municipal ordinance
to a charge of violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended),
and from a violation of a Class B misdemeanor to a Class C
misdemeanor.

The trial court over defense counsel objections

granted the prosecutor's motion to amend the Information and
thereafter instructed the jury as to such amendments (Trial
Tr. 50-53, 88-93).

The trial court took defense counsel's

motion to dismiss based upon Allqood v. Larson under advisement.

The trial court denied defense counsel's motion to

dismiss at the sentencing held on the 6th day of October,
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1992.

The trial court at sentencing after the jury had

rendered a guilty verdict in the case of State of Utah
v. Lowell D. Carlsen, on its own initiative amended the
Information by changing the name of the prosecuting party
from the State of Utah to Logan City by denying the prosecutor's motion to amend the Information at trial changing
the name of the prosecuting party (Sentencing Tr. 4 ) . Prior
to imposing sentence, defense counsel moved the trial court
for dismissal on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction
to impose sentence because of an unreasonable delay between
trial and sentencing (Sentencing Tr. 9-10).

The trial court

took this matter under advisement and imposed sentence. A
Notice of Appeal was filed by defense counsel on the 4th
day of November, 1992. A Memorandum of Decision denying
defendant's motion raised during sentencing of an unreasonable delay between trial and sentencing was filed on the 28th
day of December, 1992. A second Notice of Appeal was filed
with the Clerk of the trial court by defendant on the 20th
day of January, 1993 in the case of Logan City, State of
Utah v. Carlsen.
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c.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court imposed judgment and sentence on the
6th day of October, 1992 in the case of Logan City v.
Lowell D. Carlsen, sentencing the defendant for the offense
of selling tobacco products to a minor to pay a fine of
$ 300.00 and serve 30 days in jail at Logan, but placed the
defendant on six months informal probation.

The trial court

suspended a hundred dollars of the fine and all of the jail
sentence on the condition that defendant satisfactorily
completed the probation, (Sentencing Tr. 12).
D.
RELEVANT FACTS
The defendant, Lowell D. Carlsen, owns and operates a
business in Logan, Utah under the assumed name of Carlsenfs
Gas for Less which sells gasoline, soda pop, candy, cigarettes,
and among other things has a self-serve car wash.
The defendant was issued a citation by Logan City Police
Officer, J.G. Geier on the 8th day of November, 1991 for the
offense of selling cigarettes to a minor in violation of U.C.A.
§ 76-10-104, (R. 117), (Trial Tr. 81-82).
The defendant was charged by an Information filed in
the First Circuit Court on the 9th day of December, 1991 for
the offense of SELLING TOBACCO TO A MINOR (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR),
(R. 46), at Logan, Utah on 11/8/91 in violation of the following
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sections of the revised Ordinances of Logan City: 9.24.040.
That contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts
constituting the offense(s) were:

That the Defendant did

sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarettes or tobacco in
any form to a person under nineteen years of age. Class B
misdemeanor.
This Information was signed and authorized for presentment and filing with the trial court by Jeffrey "R"
Burbank, Logan City Prosecutor.

Mr. Burbank at the time of

preparing and filing of the Information held two positions.
Mr. Burbank served as a part time Logan City Prosecutor and
as a part time Deputy Cache County Attorney for the Cache
County Attorneyfs Office.
At trial, the defendant, Lowell D. Carlsen testified
that he was working at his place of business at approximately
6:30 PM on the 8th day of November, 1991 when a person approached the cashier's window and asked for a pack of camel light
cigarettes.

The defendant asked him if he was nineteen and

the person responded in the affirmative (Trial Tr. 96). The
defendant then asked him his date of birth and the person gave
him a date of birth which appeared to be over the age of nineteen (Trial Tr. 97). The defendant further testified that the
person (Jerren Barson) appeared to him to be over the age of
nineteen (Trial Tr. 96). The defendant thereupon sold him
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the cigarettes (Trial Tr. 98),
The defendants testimony was corroborated by the
statements he made at the time of the incident to Logan
City Police Officer, J.G. Geier who issued the citation
to the defendant for the offense of selling cigarettes to
a minor (Trial Tr. 81-87).
Jerren Barson testified that he was 16 years old
and on the night in question he was working as an operative
for the Logan City Police Department and under the directions
of Officer Tim Gil Duron (Trial Tr. 5-6). He testified that
when he approached the cashier's window at Carlsen's Gas
for Less and asked for a pack of camel light cigarettes
that the defendant did in fact asked him if he was nineteen
years of age (Trial Tr. 77). He testified that he did not
answer the question and defendant sold him the cigarettes
(Trial Tr. 77).
Tim Gil Duron testified that he was the Logan City
Police Officer in charge of the operation on November 8, 1991
and that Jerren Barson was working under his directions.

He

admitted on cross-examination that on November 8, 1991, he
was under a criminal investigation being conducted by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation on an alleged police brutality
complaint filed by defendant's son involving an incident at
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defendant's place of business on May 19, 1991.
The undisputed testimony of the defendant at the
entrapment hearing was that after he was issued the citation,
Logan City Police Officer, Tim Gil Duron drove past the
cashier's building in a westerly direction and put he head
out of the car window and laughed at the defendant real
loud (Trial Tr. 21-22) .
During jury deliberations, the jury had a note delivered to the trial judge which stated as follows:
What does the LAW State about I.D. for tobacco sales?
Does a merchant have to ask for other information?
Does a merchant need to prove age?
The trial judge responded with writing on the same
note and returning it to the jury which stated as follows:
You have received all the information which you can
receive on these points. You should proceed to decide
the case on the evidence & the instructions you have
received.
(A copy of this note and request for additional instructions was not included in the trial court's records
and the records on appeal.

A true and exact copy of the note

is included in the addendum to appellant's brief).
The jury thereafter rendered a verdict of guilty
against the defendant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Ordinance under which the defendant was charged,
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Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City
violates the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah
Constitution because the penalty conflicts with the
general laws of the State and deprived defendant of Equal
Protection of Law as secured under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
2.

The trial court erred in granting the prosecution's

motion to amend the Information at trial because:
(a)

The original Information was fatally defective

in that it charged the defendant for violating an unconstitutional and invalid Ordinance and could not be cured by
major amendments at trial.
(b)

The prosecution by the State of Utah was barred

under the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
(c)

The Logan City Prosecutor lacked any authority

to prosecute the defendant in the name of the State of Utah.
(d)

The substantial rights of the defendant were

prejudiced by the major amendments.
3.

The statute under which the defendant was convicted,

U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is unconstitutionally
vague, both facially and as applied in violation of the
Due Process Clauses under Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
-13-

4.

The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient

to sustain the defendant's conviction.
5.

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose

sentence because of an unreasonable delay of over 8 months
between trial and sentencing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED,
SECTION 9.24.040 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF LOGAN
CITY VIOLATES ARTICLE XI, § 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.
Defense counsel after the jury was impanelled and sworn,
moved the trial court for dismissal of the Information because
the penalty for violating Section 9.24.040 of the Revised
Ordinances of Logan City was in conflict with the penalty
for a violation of an identical offense under U.C.A.
§ 76-10-104, (1953 as amended), (Trial Tr. 48-50).

The trial

court at the sentencing hearing denied defense counsel's
motion (Sentencing Tr. 4-7).
The Washington Court of Appeals in the case of State
v. Hodgson, 722 P.2d 1336 at 1340 (Wash Ct.App. 1986) held
that prosecutorial discretion to seek varying degrees of
punishments from proving identical elements of a crime violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
The prosecutor in the instant case, Jeffrey "R"
Burbank who prepared, authorized, presented, signed and filed
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the Information with the trial court had the discretion
to seek varying degrees of punishment against the defendant
by proving identical elements of a criminal offense.
As pointed out earlier in the Statement of the Case,
Mr. Burbank serves two part time positions one as a Logan
City Prosecutor and the other as a Deputy Cache County
Attorney.

As a Deputy Cache County Attorney, Mr. Burbank

had the discretion to file an Information as per the citation
issued to defendant for the offense of selling tobacco
products to a minor in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, a
class C misdemeanor.

As a Logan City Prosecutor, Mr.

Burbank had the discretion to and did file an Information
for the identical offense of selling tobacco products to
a minor in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the Revised
Ordinances of Logan City, a class B misdemeanor.
The pertinent part of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, provides
as follows:
Any person who sells, gives or furnishes any cigar,
cigarette, or tobacco in any form, to any person
under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C
misdemeanor on the first offense, a class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and a class A
misdemeanor on subsequent offenses.
The pertinent part of Section 9.24.040 of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City provides as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to sell, give or
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furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco in any
form to any person under nineteen years of age.
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of
Logan City does not provide for any penalty.

The penalty

for violating Section 9.24.040 is under an omnibus clause,
Section 1.16.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City
which provides as follows:
All violations of this municipal code of which no
lesser penalties are provided, are classified as
class B misdemeanors, punishable by a fine not to
exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six
months or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Defense counsel pointed out to the trial court that
the Information itself was defective because it failed to
charge the defendant with a second violation for selling
tobacco products to a minor (Trial Tr. 49). When defense
counsel moved the Court for dismissal of the Information, the
prosecutor moved to amend the Information to charge the defendant for violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104, a class C misdemeanor (Trial Tr. 52-53).
It would certainly be a grave injustice to allow a
prosecutor the discretion to seek and obtain a class B misdemeanor conviction for the first offense of selling tobacco
products to a minor under a municipal ordinance and once
having obtained a class B conviction, to seek and obtain a
class A misdemeanor conviction for a second offense under

-16-

a state statute, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, thus circumventing
legislative intent that the first offense be a class C
misdemeanor, a second offense be a class B misdemeanor,
and any subsequent offense be a class A misdemeanor.
The prosecutor filing an Information charging the
defendant for the offense of selling tobacco products to a
minor in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinaces
of Logan City, a class B misdemeanor violated the defendant's
rights to Equal Protection of the Laws.
The defendant further contends that Section 9.24.040
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City violates the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court in Allqood v. Larson, 545 P.2d
530 at 532 (Utah 1976) held that:

If the ordinace penalty

conflicts with that of the general law of the state covering
the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void.

The charter

or ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of the state law.
The ordinance penalty in the instant case for violating
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City is a
class B misdemeanor.

This penalty exceeds that which the

defendant could be charged for an identical offense under a
statute, U.C.A. § 76-10-104 of a class C misdemeanor.
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Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion in
Allqood, 545 P.2d 530 at 533, stated as follows:
Further, without conceding, or intimating, any
view on my part that the ordinance should be
declared unconstitutional, I also observe that I
can see no justification whatever for declaring
the whole ordinance invalid. Nothing about it
could possibly be invalid except only the jail
sentence part, which can be regarded as severable.
There is a clear distinction in the instant case
and this Courtfs more recent decision in Richfield City
v. Walker, 790 P. 2d 8-7 at 90 (Utah App. 1990) where this
Court held that the challenged ordinance in that case did
not conflict with the state statute because both the ordinance
and the statute described class B misdemeanors.
The instant case differs because the ordinance describes a class B misdemeanor and the state statute of an
identical offense describes a class C misdemeanor for the
first offense.
The ordinance under which the defendant was charged,
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City
conflicts with the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the
Utah Constitution and the trial court erred in denying the
defendants motion to dismiss the Information.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PROSECUTION'S
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MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION AT TRIAL.
The Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt at trial
and after the jury was impanelled and sworn moved the
trial court to amend the Information (Trial Tr. 50-52).
Pointing out at page 90 of the Trial Transcript, the
proceedings went as follows:
Mr. HULT: That sounds fine, your Honor. The only
thing I want to do because I'm uncertain as to whether I
did previously, is to place on the record our objection to
the motion to amend. I think we discussed it, but I'm not
sure if I stated outright that we object—
THE COURT:
MR. HULT:

All right.
--to the motion to amend.

THE COURT: All right. The record will show you objection, and I've treated that as if it had been stated.
Mr. Wyatt, is there anything you want to add to what
we've said?
MR. WYATT:
Thank you.

No. I think that everything's been said,

THE COURT: All right. The Court now grants the
prosecution's motion to amend, to substitute the State of
Utah in place of Logan City as the prosecuting agency, and
grants the motion to amend to refer to the State statute as
the governing legal provision, specifically Section—can't
find it here. Thank you. 76-10-104 of the Utah Code, and
grants the motion to identify it as a Class C misdemeanor.
And the Court does that, as I say, for the purpose
of getting the issue to the jury in the proper form, at
least tentatively, and then if that's—if that's not correct,
a later decision by the Court will remedy that. It it--if
it can be done, and ti's correct, we won't have wasted the
jury's time and the witnesses' and counsel's and everyone's
time. So, I think that's the best way to proceed, and the
Court grants that motion.
The court continues and keeps under advisement defendant's motion, however, to dismiss, because of the conflict between the ordinance and the State statute.
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Pointing out at page 109 of the Trial Transcript,
the trial court thereafter instructed the jury as
follows:
THE COURT: There are a couple of things we've
done. We've amended the pleadings to show State of Utah
as the plaintiff. We won't explain to you all of the
reasons for this. It shows State of Utah as the plaintiff
in the action rather than Logan City. Mr. Wyatt's role
here is as a representative of the State of Utah, and
that's permitted under the statute at this present time.
Another change is that the offense is a Class C
misdemeanor, and you'll be instructed in these instructions
to that effect rather than a Class B misdemeanor. I think
preliminarily that's all that I need to tell you.
The jury after deliberations, returned a verdict
of guilty in the case of the State of Utah v. Lowell D.
Carlsen (R. 55).
The defendant contends that the trial court erred
in granting the prosecution's motion to amend the Information for the following reasons:
A.
THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN
THAT IT CHARGED THE DEFENDANT FOR VIOLATING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID ORDINANCE AND COULD
NOT BE CURED BY MAJOR AMENDMENTS AT TRIAL.
The defendant contends that the original Information
filed in this case was fatally defective in that it charged
him for violating an unconstitutional and invalid ordinance
as per defendant's argument under Point I herein and could
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not be cured by amendment at trial.

This contention is

consistent with the holdings of the Arizona Court of
Appeals in State V. Bollander, 484 P.2d 219-220 (Ariz.
App. 1971).
The defendant further contends that the original
Information filed in this case could not be cured by
amendment at trial because of the major amendments of
changing the name of the plaintiff and prosecuting party
from Logan City to the State of Utah; from charging the
defendant for violating Section 9.24.040 of the Revised
Ordinance of Logan City to charging defendant with violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104; and from a class B misdemeanor to
a class C misdemeanor.
This contention is consistent with the holdings
of the Colorado Supreme Court in Cervantes v. State,
715 P.2d 783 at 786 (Colo. 1986) where that Court in citing
Bustamante v. People, 317 P.2d 885,887 (1957) held that the
sufficiency of an information is a matter of jurisdiction,
so any conviction based on an information requiring major
amendment is void.
B.
THE PROSECUTION BY THE STATE OF UTAH WAS BARRED
UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, AND
ARTICLE I, § 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
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The defendant contends that the prosecution in
the name of the State of Utah was barred by the Double
Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
The pertinent part of U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as
amended) provides as follows:
A criminal action for any violation of a state
statute shall be prosecuted in the name of the
State of Utah. A criminal action for violation
of any county or municipal ordinance shall be
prosecuted in the name of the governmental entity
involved.
Pointing out at page 91-92 of the Trial Transcript,
the proceedings went as follows:
THE COURT: I'm not sure but what the motion of
the defendant is well taken, that you have a conflict
here between the City ordinance and the State statute
and it's too late to cure it. I think that's what Mr.
Hult's position is; that the jury's been sworn and
defendant's in jeopardy, and I think what he's saying is,
if that's a bad approach to the prosecution, then it can't
be brought again. I suppose that would be your argument.
MR. HULT: Yes, if there was a refiling, but more
particularly, at this point in time, that that one statute
giving them authority to prosecute State statutes doesn't
apply to something that occurred before January 1st, in
addition to the prejudice that the defendant's suffering
at this late stage of the proceedings.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strand, 674 P.2d
109 at 114 (Utah 1983) held that a criminal Information
could not be amended if the amendment places the defendant
twice in jeopardy.
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The United States Supreme Court in Waller v.
Florida/ 397 U.S. 487, 25 L.Ed.2d 435, 90 S.Ct. 1184
(1970) held that a prosecution by a municipal government
for violating a municipal ordinance bars a subsequent
prosecution by a State government for an identical offense
under a State statute under the Double Jeopardy and Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
The question then in the instant case is whether
the defendant was sufficiently placed in jeopardy in the
prosecution by Logan City, a municipal government for
violating a municipal ordinance of selling tobacco products
to a minor in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the Revised
Ordinances of Logan City to bar prosecution by the State of
Utah for an identical offense of selling tobacco products
to a minor in violation of a State statute, U.C.A. § 76-10104, (1953 as amended).
The Utah Supreme Court in Boyer v. Larson, 433 P.2d
1015 at 1016 (Utah 1967) held that jeopardy attaches to a
defendant in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and
sworn.

This Court in the more recent decision in State v.

Nilson, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 at 47 (Utah App. 1993) held
that jeopardy attaches to a defendant in a jury trial when
the jury is impaneled and sworn.
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The United States Supreme

Court in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 57 L.Ed.2d 24,
98 S.Ct. 2156 (1978) held that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that jeopardy attaches to a defendant in a jury trial
when the jury is impaneled and sworn.
The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to
amend the information after the jury was impaneled and sworn,
and the prosecutor had presented his case in chief in the
case of Logan City v. Lowell D. Carlsen for the offense of
selling tobacco products to a minor in violation of Section
9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City.

The amend-

ments to the Information authorizing the State of Utah to
prosecute the defendant for the identical offense of selling
tobacco products to a minor in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10104 was barred by the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.

The verdict rendered by the jury in the case

of the State of Utah v. Lowell D. Carlsen should therefore
be declared null and void by this Honorable Court.
C.
THE LOGAN CITY PROSECUTOR LACKED ANY AUTHORITY TO
PROSECUTE THE DEFENDANT IN THE NAME OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
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The defendant contends that Logan City Prosecutor,
Scott L. Wyatt lacked any authority to prosecute him in
the name of the State of Utah for two reasons. First,
is that the statute authorizing city attorneys and
prosecutor's to prosecute criminal offenses in the name
of the State of Utah, U.C.A. § 10-3-928 (Effective
January 1, 1992) is ex post facto legislation.

Second,

U.C.A. § 10-3-928, (Effective January 1, 1992) is in conflict
with the provisions of Article VIII, § 16 of the Utah
Constitution.
The city prosecutor in this case claimed authority
to represent the State of Utah and charge the defendant
with violating a state statute under an amendment to U.C.A.
§ 10-3-928 which became effective January 1, 1992. Trial
was held in this case on January 16, 1992 but the alleged
offense occurred on November 8, 1991 and the original
Information was filed with the trial court on December 8,
1991.
Permitting the city prosecutor to prosecute violations
of state statutes which occurred prior to this grant of
authority constitutes a violation of defendant's rights
against ex post facto laws under Article I, § 9 & § 10 of
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 18 of the
Utah Constitution.
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While it is discretionary with the legislature
when granting, limiting, or redistributing jurisdiction
in criminal cases, to include past offenses, Post v. United
States, 161 U.S. 583, 40 L.Ed. 816, 16 S.Ct. 611, no such
grant of authority has been made by the legislature in
this case.

There is no relaxation of the ex post facto

prohibition even in the area of changes of jurisdiction of
the prosecuting authority unless specifically granted.

The

new authority of the city prosecutor to prosecute state
offenses in the name of the State of Utah can only apply to
offenses committed within the municipal boundaries on or
after January 1, 1992.
The Utah Supreme Court in Footnote 1 in Doe v.
Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 782 P.2d 489 at 490 (Utah 1989)
stated as follows:
Both Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-2 and § 67-15-10.5 were
amended subsequent to the initiation of this action.
The later amendments have no application in this case,
and we do not assess their legal force or effect.See
generally Utah Const, art. I, § 18; U.S. Const, art.
I, §§ 9, 10 (ex post facto law constitutional prohibitions) .
Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt had no authority
to prosecute the defendant in the name of the State of Utah
when this action was initiated by the filing of the Information
on December 8, 1991 (R. 46).
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The Utah Constitution requires that prosecutions
for criminal actions in the name of the State of Utah be
by elected public prosecutors.

Thus, the prosecution of

the defendant in this case under a State statute in the
name of the State of Utah by a city attorney, an appointed
official, violates the provisions of Article VIII, § 16
of the Utah Constitution which provides as follows:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibilities
for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in
the name of the State of Utah and shall perform
such other duties as may be provided by statute.
Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner
provided by statute, and shall be admitted to
practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor
fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court
shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro
tempore.
It is clear from this provision that the public
prosecutors given responsibility for bringing criminal
actions in the name of the State of Utah are to be elected
officials, not appointed officials. See, Footnote 2 in
Searle v. Briqqs, 800 P.2d 804, 806 (Utah 1990).

There

is no statutory provision in Utah providing for the elections
of city attorneys.

Rather, they are appointed. U.C.A. §

10-3-809 and § 10-3-902, (1953 as amended).

Also, as

demonstrated under the argument of Point I of this Brief,
U.C.A. § 10-3-928 gives city attorneys the discretion to
seek varying degrees of punishment by proving identical
elements of a crime and the discretion to prosecute under
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a municipal ordinance or a State statute for an identical
offense but different penalties violates Equal Protection
of the Laws.

Hence, the amendments to prosecute the defendant

in the name of the State of Utah under a State statute by
the Logan City Prosecutor was invalid.
D.
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT WERE
PREJUDICED BY THE AMENDMENTS.
The pertinent part of Rule 4{d) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
The court may permit an indictment or information
to be amended at any time before verdict if no
additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense
with such particularity as to bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense upon the same
set of facts.
The defendant contends that his substantial rights
were prejudiced by the amendments in the instant case.
State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).
First, the substantial rights of the defendant not to
be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense were prejudiced by the amendments.

Secondly, the defendant's right

to trial by a fair and impartial jury secured under Article I,
§ 12, Utah Constitution were prejudiced. State v. Durand, 569
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977).
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The jury in this case may

have been mislead and improperly influenced by the
numerous and major amendments to the Information.

The

amendments may have created the false impression in the
minds of the jurors that defendant may have committed or
was charged with numerous offenses, both against the State
of Utah and Logan City.

The amendments to the Information

in this case after the original information was read to
the jury, deprived defendant of his rights to a fair and
impartial jury trial.

Third, the lack of any prior notice

that the defendant would be prosecuted for violating U.C.A.
§ 76-10-104, deprived the defendant of the opportunity to
challenge in the trial court, the constitutionality of the
statute as per the argument of the defendant under Point III
of this Brief.
POINT III
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
The defendant contends that the statute under which
he was convicted, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is
unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied in
this case in violation of the Due Process Clauses under
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

United States

v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29, 9 L.Ed2d 83, 83
S.Ct. 594 (1963).
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The defendant submits that this issue was not
raised before the trial court.

Defendant contends that

because of the plain error and exceptional circumstances
involved in this case that the issue may be raised for
the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4,5 (Utah 1992); and State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d
920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

The exceptional circumstances

in this case being that defendant was not given adequate
notice that he would be prosecuted under the statute and
the validity of the ordinance under which he was originally
charged was challenged on other grounds.

Defense counsel

objected to the amendment to the Information and to the
prosecution under U.C.A. § 76-10-104 (Trial Tr. 90).
There was plain error because the error should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error, and
the error in this case affected the substantial rights of
the defendant.
The defendant was convicted for violating the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, which provides as follows:
Any person who sells, gives or furnishes any cigar,
cigarette, or tobacco in any form, to any person
under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C misdemeanor on the first offense, a class B misdemeanor
on the second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on
subsequent offenses.
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 is unconstitutionally vague not
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only in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute," United State v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S.Ct. 808; but
lacks any ascertainable standards of guilt, Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-166, 31 L.Ed.
2d 110, 117-118, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972); but also fails to
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,
Smith v. Goquen, 415 U.S. 566, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct.
1242 (1974); and the statute's vagueness encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736.
The United States Supreme Court in Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, 103
S.Ct. 1855 (1983) stated as follows:
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. - - - - -[citation omitted]
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice
to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of
the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but
the other principal element of the doctrine—the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guildelines to govern law enforcement." Smith, 415
U.S. at 574, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Where
the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless
sweep [that] allows policeman, prosecutors, and juries
to pursue their personal predilections." Id., at 575,
39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242.
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The Utah Legislature in enacting the provisions of
U.C.A. § 76-10-104, failed to establish such minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement as required under Smith
and Kolender, thus allowing the police, prosecutors and
juries to pursue their own personal predilections.

This

can be demonstrated in the instant case by the issues and
questions of law raised by the jury during their deliberation.
During jury deliberations, the jury had a note delivered to the trial judge which stated as follows:
What does the LAW State about I.D. for tobacco sales?
Does a merchant have to ask for other information?
Does a merchant need to prove age?
The trial judge responded with writing on the same
note and returning it to the jury which stated as follows:
You have received all the information which you can
receive on these points. You should proceed to decide the case on the evidence and the instructions
you have received.
The lack of such minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement required the jury in the instant case to pursue
their own personal predilections.
This can further be demonstrated by comparing U.C.A.
§ 76-10-104 with other statutes involving businesses and
minors.

For example, U.C.A. § 76-10-103, (1953 as amended)

which provides as follows:
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It is a class C misdemeanor for the proprietor of
any place of business to knowingly permit persons
under age nineteen to frequent a place of business
while they are using tobacco.
The prosecution under the provisions of § 76-10-103
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the proprietor of a business knowingly permitted persons
under age nineteen to frequent the business while they are
using tobacco.
An identical situation exists involving sales of
alcoholic beverages to minors, U.C.A. § 32A-12-203(b),
(1953 as amended).

The prosecution has the burden of prov-

ing beyond a reasonable doubt that a person knowingly sold
or furnished alcoholic beverages to a person under the age
of 21.
What is lacking in the challenged statute in the instant case, § 76-10-104 is the requirement for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person
knowingly sold or furnished tobacco products to a person
under the age of nineteen.

The prosecution need only to

prove that a person sold or furnished cigarettes to a person
who happens or turns out to be under the age of nineteen.
The prosecution has no burden to prove any mens rea, knowledge
or criminal intent.

A merchant or cashier who sells cigarettes

to a person who appears to be nineteen and furnishes the
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merchant or cashier with false Identification which appears
to be valid and showing their age to be nineteen could be
arrested, prosecuted and conviction under the provisions
of U.C.A. § 76-10-104.

Or the application of § 76-10-104

to the facts of the instant case.
The defendant testified at trial that when he sold
the cigarettes to Jerren Barson on November 8, 1991, Jerren
Barson appeared to him to be of the age between 20 and 22.
(Trial Tr. 96). The defendant further testified that he
asked Jerren Barson if he was nineteen and Jerren Barson
responded in the affirmative. (Trial Tr. 96). The defendant
then asked Jerren Barson his date of birth and Jerren Barson
responded by stating December, 71. (Trial Tr. 97). The
defendant's testimony is corroborated by the statements
he made at the time of the incident to Logan City Police
Officer, J.G. Geier. (Trial Tr. 81-87).
The Federal Courts have held that Due Process requires that knowledge and intent be essential elements of
a crime. Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 968 (D.C. 111. 1968).
The Nebraska Court has held that elimination of
criminal intent as element necessary for violation of a
statute may violate due process when penalty for violation
of statute is severe or conviction for violation of statute
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may irreparably damage the defendant's reputation.
State v. Pettit, 445 N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1989).
A conviction for violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104
which can ultimately result in a class A misdemeanor
conviction, punishable by a year imprisonment and a fine
of $ 2,500.00 is a severe penalty requiring the inclusion
of knowledge or criminal intent as a necessary element
of the offense.
The trial court instructed the jury in this case
under Instruction No. 6 as follows:
Before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime
of Selling Tobacco to a Minor, you must find from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime, to-wit:
1. That the defendant did sell tobacco to another
person.
2. That the other such person was under the age of
19 years.
3. That the act did take place on or about November
8, 1991.
4. That the act did take place in Logan City, Cache
County, State of Utah.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant of this offense. On the other hand, if the
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of
the said elements, then you should find the defendant
not guilty of this offense.
Clearly, by this Instruction, defendant was not con-
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victed by the jury of knowingly selling tobacco to a
person under the age of nineteen.

Instruction No. 7

given to the jury by the trial court merely gives the
legal definition of knowledge and criminal intent as
defined under the provisons of U.C.A. § 76-2-103,
(1953 as amended), and the instruction does not state
that such knowledge or criminal intent was an essential
element of the offense in order to convict.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Blue, 17 Utah
175, 53 P. 978 (Utah 1898) held that a public officer
was not punishable for an act committed innocently without criminal intent, where statute, with no reference to
mental state, made private appropriation of public money
a felony.
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 should not be construed to be
a strict liability statute because it does not clearly
indicate a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental
state. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984); and
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed. 288,
72 S.Ct. 240 (1952).
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The United States Supreme Court under Footnote 7
in Kolender, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909
stated as follows:
Our concern for minimal guidelines finds its roots
as far back as our decision in United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876):
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and
who should be set at large. This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of government."
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 is incapable of any valid
application because of the lack of knowledge or criminal
intent being essential elements of the offense and is
therefore facially invalid. Greenwood v. City of North Salt
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); and State v. Pharris,
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 45 (Utah App. 1993).

Furthermore,

§ 76-10-104 is invalid as applied to the facts of this
case both in the sense of the lack of fair notice but also
the lack of minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement in
violation of the Due Process Clauses under Article I, § 7
of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Courts will
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not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in
order to reach a constitutional construction.

Provo City

Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989).
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 lacks minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement because of the lack of any standards
relating to Identification requirements for merchants in
the business of selling tobacco products, thus allowing the
police, prosecutors and juries to pursue their own personal
predilections as to such Identification requirements.

The

jury's request in the instant case for additional instructions
shows that four persons of ordinary intelligence could not
reasonably understand the conduct proscribed under the provisions of U.CoA. § 76-10-104.

This Court should therefore

declare the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-104 to be unconstitutionally vague and reverse the conviction of the defendant.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
It is the defendant's contention that the evidence
adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
The United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979) held
that a criminal conviction violates the Due Process Clause
when viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most
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favorable to the prosecution/ no rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty of each and every
essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Knoll, 712
P.2d 211 at 214 (Utah 1985) stated as follows:
This Court has in numerous cases stated that in
presenting defenses in criminal cases a defendant
does not bear the burden of persuasion. It is
sufficient for acquittal that the evidence or lack
thereof creates a reasonable doubt as to any element
of the crime. State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah
1977); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975);
and State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145 (Utah 1974).
The ultimate burden of proving the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the
state, whether defendant offers any evidence in
an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not.
State v. Curtis, supra.
Defense counsel in the instant case submitted a
written request and proposed instruction with the trial court
requesting the Court to instruct the jury on Mistake of
Fact as defined under the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-2-304,
(1953 as amended). (R. 52-54).

The trial court decline

to

give the jury the requested instruction (R. 53). When the
jury requested the trial court for additional instructions
on identification requirements on tobacco sales, the trial
court failed to give the jury the requested instruction.
State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Elton, 680 P.2d
727, 731 (Utah 1984) held that mistake of fact as to the age
-39-

of an alleged victim is a defense to a criminal prosecution.
The evidence adduced at trial in the instant case shows
a clear mistake of fact as to the age of Jerren Barson.

The

defendant testified at trial that when he sold the cigarettes
to Jerren Barson on November 8, 1991, Jerren Barson appeared
to him to be of the age between 20 and 22. (Trial Tr. 96).
The defendant further testified that he asked Jerren Barson
if he was nineteen and Jerren Barson responded in the affirmative. (Trial Tr. 96). The defendant further testified that
he then asked Jerren Barson his date of birth, and Jerren
Barson without batting an eye responded by stating December,
71. (Trial Tr. 97). The defendant's testimony is corroborated
by the statements he made at the time of the incident to
Logan City Police Officer, J.G. Geier. (Trial Tr. 81-87).
Jerren Barson testified that the defendant did in
fact asked him if he was 19 years of age. (Trial Tr. 77). He
further testified that defendant proceeded to sell the cigarettes to him without waiting for an answer or reponse (Trial
Tr. 77). This testimony of Jerren Barson suggests that the
defendant acts differently than any other merchant or cashier
in the retail business.
charge?

For example, will this be cash or

Is it the norm for a cashier to sell an item or pro-

duct without waiting for a response from the customer?

This

testimony of Jerren Barson is so inherently improbable, that
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no reasonable minds could believe it.

State v. Meyers,

606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1980); State v. Workman, 806 P.2d
1198, 1204 (Utah App. 1991), affirmed

P.2d

(Utah 1993) .
The prosecution in the instant case failed to
establish and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had a culpable mental state or a criminal state
of mind as required under U.C.A. § 76-2-101, (1953 as
amended); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984);
and State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, 53 P. 978, 980 (Utah 1898),
to sell cigarettes to a person under the age of nineteen in
violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104.

The evidence adduced at

trial was sufficiently inconclusive as to justify and
warrant the reversal of the defendant's conviction by
this Court.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983);

and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE
SENTENCE BECAUSE OF AN UNREASONABLE DELAY
BETWEEN TRIAL AND SENTENCING.
The defendant next contends that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to impose sentence because of an unreasonable delay between trial and sentencing.
Defense counsel at the sentencing hearing held on
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October 6, 1992, moved for dismissal on grounds of the delay between trial and sentencing. (Sentencing Tr. 9 ) . The
defendant submits that this was a jurisdictional question
and actually a motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 23
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Merritt,
67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (Utah 1926).

The trial court took

the matter under advisement and denied the motion in a
Memorandum of Decision filed on December 28, 1992 (R. 72).
A second Notice of Appeal was filed by defendant from this
decision. (R. 82).
The defendant without being advised of his right to
be sentenced not less than two nor more than 30 days as provided under Rule 22(a) URCrimP, agreed to be sentenced in a
five or six week period or the end of February, 1992. (Trial
Tr.

112-113).

The postponement of sentencing was to allow

the trial judge to take under advisement, defendant's motion
to dismiss raised at trial and the trial court agreed to issue
a memorandum decision on the motion within said period of
time.

(Trial Tr. 113). No written memorandum decision was

issued by the trial court and defendant was not sentenced
until October 6, 1992.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Helm, 563 P.2d
794 (Utah 1977) held that the time limits are directory, not
mandatory, and trial court's failure to comply with them does
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not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sentence; where
sentence is imposed within reasonable time so that the delay
does not amount to an abuse of the court's powers or adversely affect the defendant.
The failure of the trial court to pass sentence in
the instant case was a clear abuse of the courtfs power
because of the trial court's failure to render a decision
and issue a written memorandum as to the issue under advisement within the 60 day period as required under U.C.A.
78-7-25 (1988 Amendment).
Furthermore, the defendant was adversely affected by
the delay because of the frustration of his right to appeal
the verdict of jury and his conviction.
316 U.S. 255, 86 L.Ed. 1453 (1942).

Cochran v. Kansas,

The defendant in the

instant case stood convicted by a jury for a period of over
eight months prior to imposition of sentence to allow him
to appeal his conviction.
Clearly, defendant's consent to be sentence within a
five or six week period should not be construed to be a
waiver for a period of over eight months.
Furthermore, the trial court's amendment of the Information at sentencing by changing the name of the prosecuting party after verdict from the State of Utah to Logan
City violated Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
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cedures and U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended).
CONCLUSION
The defendant-appellant respectfully submits that
based upon the foregoing, his conviction for the offense
of Selling Tobacco to a Minor should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter an
Order dismissing the original Information with prejudice
or other proceedings consistent with this Courtfs decision,
DATED this CT^N day of Juiyr~T995v

LOWELL D. CARLSEN
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed two true and exact copies
of the Brief of Appellant and Addendum to Appellant's
Brief to Scott L. Wyatt, Attorney for Appellee, located
at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and

of July, 1993.
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A D D E N D U M

codified in this chapter, is described as follows: One and
one-half to one and three-fourths inches in diameter/ the
impression of which represents an eagle perched on a beehive
and the inscription ••Corporate Seal of Logan City," and two
stars in the margin, is declared to have been, that it is
now, and hereafter shall be the corporate seal of the city.
(Prior code §1-4-1)
1,12.020 City name. The official name of the city
shall hereafter be styled as "The City of Logan." (Prior
code §1-4-2)
Chapter 1.16
GENERAL PENALTY

Sections:
1,.16 . 0 1 0
1 .16 .020
1,.16, .030
1..16, .040
1.,16, .050
1.,16, .060

Violation—Class B misdemeanor.
Violation—Misdemeanor.
Continuing violation.
Liability—Officer, agent or servant of
corporation.
Accessories.
Prisoner labor.

1. ,16. .010 Violation—Class B misdemeanor. All violations of this municipal code^ for which no lesser penalties
are.provided, are classified as class,B misdemeanors, punishable by a fine not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed
six months or by both such fine and imprisonment. (Added
during 1989 codification)

9.24.040 Persons under the age of nineteen years—Sale
of tobacco to. It is unlawful for any person to sell, give
or furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco in any form to
any person under nineteen years of age. (Prior code §12-74)

214

76-10-103

CRIMINAL CODE

76-10-103. Permitting minors to use tobacco in place of
businessIt is a class C misdemeanor for the proprietor of any place of business to
knowingly permit persons under age nineteen to frequent a place of business
while they are using tobacco.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-103.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur„ 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 18.
C.J.S. — 43 CJ.S. Infants §§ 92, 95.
Key Numbers. — Infants •» 13.

76-10-104. Furnishing cigars, cigarettes or tobacco to
minors — Penalties.
Any person who sells, gives, or furnishes any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in
any form, to any pel f n under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C misdemeanor on the first Onense, a class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and
a class A misdemeanor on subsequent offenses.
History: C 1953, 76-10-104, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, 5 39; 1989, ch. 194, $ 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974,
ch. 32, § 39 repealed former § 76-10-104, as
enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104, relating to use of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco in
enclosed public place, and enacted present
§ 76-10-104.

Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July X. 1989, added "on the first
offense, a class B misdemeanor on the second
offense, and a class A misdemeanor on subsequent offenses'' at the end of the section and
made a minor stylistic change.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 16.
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 92, 95.

A.L.R. — Civil liability for tobacco sales to
minors, 55 A.L.R.4th 1238.
Key Numbers. — Infants «=» 13.

76-10-105. Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or
tobacco by minors — Penalty — Compliance officer authority — Juvenile court jurisdiction.
(1) Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C
misdemeanor, or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
(2) A compliance officer appointed by a board of education under Section
53A-3-402 may iss^ citations for violations of this section committed on
school property. Cited violations shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile
court.

312

76*2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
<2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal
law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense, and
33

78-7-25. Decisions to be rendered within sixty days — Procedures for decisions not rendered.
(1) A judge of a trial court shall decide all matters submitted for final
determination within 60 days of submission, unless circumstances causing the
delay are beyond the judge's personal control
(2) The Judicial Council shall establish reporting procedures for all matters
not decided within 60 days of "final submission.
History: L. 1969, ch. 249, § 1; 1977, ch. 77, decided by him which has been finally submit§ 67; 1988, ch. 248, § 47.
ted for his consideration and determination beAmendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- yond a sixty-day period unless circumstances
ment, effective April 25, 1988, subdivided and causing such delay are beyond his personal
rewrote the section which had read "No judge control."
of the circuit court^or district court shall keep - —Cross-References, — Circuit courts, Chap
in. his possession any matter H'controversyliot»4er.«4 of this title.

174

77-1-5. Prosecuting party,
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted in
; S o f t « * * * ***• A criminal action for violation ^
S
£

S T S o l S " ** * Pn,SeCUted " *• name ° f the ««inSS
J ^ l Z i F

m

Croes-Referlnce. _

*

^

^

^ ^

Prosecutions to be

^ d - ^ - n a m e of^the State of Utah/Utah
^

** ^

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «• 12.

421

§

*

—Time.
Time fixed by statute was not jurisdictional.
Rose v. District Court, 67 Utah 526,248 P. 486
(1926).
The time fixed by the statute was not jurisdictional and since it was regarded as merely
directory the further provision that a judgment
should be rendered within a reasonable time
has been judicially read into the statute. State
v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953).
Time limits are directory, not mandatory,
and trial court's failure to comply with them
does not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sentence; where sentence is imposed within a reasonable time so that the delay does not amount
to an abuse of the court's powers or adversely
affect the defendant, he ia not entitled to go
free but only to have a correct sentence imposed, with due consideration given for any
time served because of the delay. State v.
Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977).
Defendant who was convicted in March,

Failure to object to delay in pronouncing
judgment waived the right to object. Rose v.
District Court, 67 Utah 526,248 P. 486 (1926).
Statements before sentencing.
—Defendant
Requirement that defendant be asked
whether he has any cause why judgment
should not be pronounced against him was substantially complied with by question as to
whether he or his counsel had anything to
state prior to sentencing. State v. McClendon,
611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980).
The defendant's due process right of allocution was satisfied when the sentencing hearing
was held in his presence, where he was addressed by the judge and elected to speak; an
amended judgment subsequently entered by
the trial court, at which the defendant was not
present nor represented by counsel, reflected
only a correction of a clerical mistake in his
sentence. State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah
1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 526 et seq.
C J.8. — 24 C J.S. Criminal Law § 1556 et
seq.
A.L.R* — Consideration of accused's juvenile
court record in sentencing for offense committed as adult, 64 A.L.R.3d 1291.
Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 98 A.L.R.3d 605.

Propriety of sentencing justice's consideration of defendant's failure or refusal to accept
plea bargain, 100 A.L.R.3d 834.
Accused's right to sentencing by same judge
who accepted guilty plea entered pursuant to
plea bargain, 3 A.L.R.4th 1181.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 977 to
996.

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until
395

32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to minors.
• c*n offer to se22, or otherwise furnish or supply any
(1) A person may ^ r^o d u £c
p e r s o n under the age of 21 years,
alcoholic beverage or F
^ ^ / ^ b s e c t i o n (1) a person who knowingly
(2) Except as < f ™ ^
a'ny alcoholic beverage
sells, offers to sell, or " J * ^ 1 ^ ^ 0f 21 years is guilty of a class A
or product to any person under trie age u
,

title.
History: C. 1953, a Z A - l ^ n a c t e d byJL
1985, ch. 175, § l; renumbered by L. 1990.
en. 23, § 132; 1991, ch. 49, § 1; 1991, ch. 241,
S

^°*
J «,„» Notes.
Not^s — The
Amendment
w* 1991 amend^
merit by ch. 49, effective March 13 1991, a*»a
"; c.,k.~»./». i9irf»«.<matedformer Sub-

t,on of the section a class A ™^e™™?r™*
provided a minimum mandatory fine of $500.
The 1991 amendment
*f™:*%£
April 29 1991, substituted "class B for class
A'in the first sentence » former Subsection
<3

Th,s section is set out as reconciled by the

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
tence; and made various stylistic and phraseology changes throughout the section.
The 1987 amendment by ch. 228 added Subsection (6) and made minor changes in phrase-ology and punctuation throughout the section.
The 1989 amendment, effective July 1,1989,j
rewrote this section, which formerly provided1
for municipal justices of the peace.

10-3-928

The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,
1992, designated the formerly undesignated
language as Subsection (1), added Subsections
(2) through (8), and deleted "that is not a municipal department or a primary location of the
circuit court" after "municipality" in Subsection (1).

10-3-928. Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor [Effective until January 1, 1992].
(1) The city attorney may prosecute violations of city ordinances and has
the same powers in respect to violations of city ordinances as are exercised by
a county attorney in respect to violations of state law, including, but not
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city ordinances.
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a deputy public prosecutor by the
attorney general, the county attorney of the county in which the city is situated, or any other public prosecutor having jurisdiction within the city limits.
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be for a period of time as
specified at the time of oath taking but shall not exceed one year and shall be
subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the city attorney may prosecute, in the
name of the state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated as such by
the Legislature and committed within the territorial limits of the city.

Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor
[Effective January 1, 1992].
In cities with a city attorney,-the city attorney may prosecute violations of
city ordinances, and under state law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring
within the boundaries of the mimicipality and has the same powers in respect
to the violations as are exercised by a county attorney, including, but not
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses. The city attorney shall represent
the interests of the state or the municipality in the appeal of any matter
prosecuted in any trial court by the city attorney.
History: C. 1953, 10-3-931, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3; redes, as 10-3-928; 1987, ch.
140, § 1; 1991, ch. 268, § 2.
Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1992. —
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 2 amends this section
effective January 1, 1992. See amendment
notes below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment designated the existing language as Subsection (1); added Subsection (2); and made
minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1).
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,
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1992, deleted the Subsection (1) designation
and former Subsection (2), relating to appointments of city attorneys as deputy public prosecutors, rewrote the first sentence, which read
'The city attorney may prosecute violations of
city ordinances and has the same powers in
respect to violations of city ordinances as are
exercised by a county attorney in respect to
violations of state law, including, but not limited to, granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city ordinances," and added the second sentence.

ART. I, § 7

CONSTITUTION OF UTAII

Gun control laws, validity and construetion of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 815.
Law Reviews.
The Constitutional Right to Keep and

Bear Arms, Lucilius A. Kmery, 23 Hrirv.
L. Kcv. 473.
Restrictions on the Right To TV;»r Anus
—Slate and Federal Firearms Lcp.-.lnSimi,
98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 005.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. I l l , §27.

body, or agency authorized by law to detcnuiiie the questions; (b) an inquiry
i n t o thft marlttt *£

i l

-

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused personso]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public triai-by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Comparable Provision.

—acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Cross-Reference.
Prohibition on private nr ap^UI U*r«

Art. VTH, § 16

State •. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
IT ft?** 116 P *>*

7gfi

—

"

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. — Judges *» 10, 11.

Sec, 16. [Public prosecutors-]
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in
the name of the State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided
by statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 1.

Sees. 17 to 28. [Repealed.]
n A *vciala — <?«»«» t-hp rnmniler's n o t e follow-

Compiler's Notes. — Former Article Vm
contained no comparable provisions.

Section
76-2-305.

76-2-306.
76-2-307.
76-2-308.

Mental illness — Use as a defense
,— Influence of alcohol or other
substance voluntarily consumed — Definition.
Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary termination of efforts
prior to offense.
Affirmative defenses.

Section
76-2-402.
76-2-403.
76-2-404.
76-2-405.
76-2-406.

Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined.
Force in arrest.
Peace officer's use of deadly force.
Force in defense of habitation.
Force in defense of property.

Part 4
Justification Excluding Criminal
Responsibility
76-2-401.

Justification as defense — When
allowed.

PART 1
CULPABILITY GENERALLY
76-2-10L Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal
responsibility.
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability.
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, ch. 90, § 1;
1983, ch. 98, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

76-2-103

dangerous drugs as contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 36 A.L.R.3d 1292.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 23.

76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable
mental state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Depraved indifference.
Cited.
Depraved indifference.
In a prosecution for second degree murder,
although the court's jury instruction did not
expressly treat the element of knowledge,
there was no error since the other jury instructions and the evidence of the defendant's ac-

tions left little room for the jury to misunderstand that the defendant must have been
aware that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another, within the definitions contained in the instructions. State v. Fontana,
680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
Cited in State v. Whitehair, 735 P.2d 39
(Utah 1987); In re Estate of Wagley, 760 R2d
316 (Utah 1988); State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d
1329 (Utah 1989).
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I CERTIFY THAT COPV OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPOBTCHE
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE ANr>SO
ALLEGE THAT THE AROVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER
TTHER CERTIFY THAT THE
TH COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT
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IN THE CIRCUIT C^fRT,
CO0RT, SI
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT

LOGAN CITY.
I N F O R M A T I O N

Plaintiff
vs.
CARLSEN, Lowell
720 North 400 East'
Logan, Utah
8/9/25

No.

911001337

Defendant

The undersigned,C Andrews. ,
under oath, states on the information and
belief that the above named Defendant committed the crime(s) of:
SELLING TOBACCO TO A MINOR (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR)
at Logan, Utah on 11/8/91 in violation of the following sections of the Revised
Ordinances of Logan City:
9.24.040
That contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts constituting the
offense(s) were:
That the Defendant did sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco in
any form to a person under nineteen years of age.
ClassBMisdemeanor
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
J. G. GEIER, LCPD
T. G. DURON, LCPD
K. HAWKES, LCPD
T. Barson
J. Barson
Authorized for presentment & f

d&IU*S

£LL±.

COMPLAINANT
Log^r^j^/^osecutorTAttorney
DAMAGES :W~

YES

Subscribed & sworn to before me
this f day of p^_^
19 <?/.

NO
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Case No. j £ L
DEC 1 2 1991
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«£OCAtrCITY,
Plaintiff,

vs

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY
CASE NO. 911001337

LOWELL CARLSEN,

Defendant,
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the laws that apply to
this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow the laws as the Court
states them to you, regardless of what you personally believe the laws
are or ought to be. On the other hand;- it is your exclusive province to
determine the facts in the case, and to consider and weigh the evidence
for that purpose.
INSTRUCTION NO:

1

The Defendant, Lowell Carlsen is charged with the crimes of Selling
Tobacco to a Minor, a Class p Misdemeanor, to wit:
That the Defendant did sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarette or
tobacco in any form to a person under nineteen years of age.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\Q

Before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of Selling
Tobacco to a Minor/ you must find from the evidence/ beyond a reasonable
doubt/ all of the following elements of that crime/ to-wit:
1.

That the defendant did sell tobacco to a another person.

2.

That the other such person was under the age of 19 years.

3.

That the act did take place on or about Noveber 8# 1991.

4.

That the act did take place in Logan City/ Cache County/ State of
Utah.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt/ it is your
duty to convict the defendant of this offense.

On the other hand/ if the

evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements/
then you should find the defendant not guilty of this offense.

Nathan Hult - 4704
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 543
110 North 100 East
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-7400
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,

*

Plaintiff,

REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONS

*

vs.

*

LOWELL D. CARLSEN,

*

Defendant.

Case No.

911001337

*

The Defendant requests that the following jury instructions
be given in addition to appropriate stock instruction.
Dated this

/

day of January, 1992.

Nathan Hult

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby give notice that I hand-delivered a copy of the
foregoing:
individual on

REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONS to the below named
JLy^.-

/ £

/ 1992.

Scott Wyatt/
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

^7/u,£ ILJ/92/01

INSTRUCTION NO.
An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a
defense for that crime.
Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if he commits an act
or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would
made such act or omission lawful.

K^UIJ." L U U K 1 , OXM.1.E. u r

UIJI

CACHE COUNTY, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT

•LQCAN CITY, , d
Plaintiff
VERDICT

vs

NO. 911001337
LOWELL CARLSEN,
Defendant

We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Lowell
Carlsen, Guilty of Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor.

(/l&^ \IJfitm^^<
Dated: \JAH / $

92-

Foreperson

First Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Cache.
Logan Department
STATg-Ol'1 UTAH

LOGAN CITY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
No.

IHJMJjf

><//{'*.•

-

-

f

(UAJIQI.K>^S
Defendant

Defendant (having^been adjudged) (entered a ploa of) GI7JLTY to the charge of
Count No. 1

^ J//A

m I &A.

CW

fAA

d

•

J J

A

-

/yUjtt£^>

a Class

Count No. 2

a Class

Count No. 3

a Class

Count No.4
a Class
Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being
present (with) (having waived) Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows:
Count No. 1

Defendant is fined $

. plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended
TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for _

days in the Cache County Jail with _

Count No. 2

Defendant is fined $

$

, days to be suspended on payment of fine.

plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended

$

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for

days in the Cache County Jail with

Count No. 3

Defendant is fined $

$

days to be suspended on payment of fine.

plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended

$

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for

days in the Cache County Jail with

Count No. 4

Defendant is fined $

$

days to be suspended on payment of fine.

plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended

$

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for

days in the Cache County Jail with

days to be suspended on payment of fine.

Stay of Execution to FRIDAY

at 4:30 p.m. and the defendant is

ordered to appear in Court at said time. Fine to be paid in installments of S

met, -r

$

^ r/)i

/--/«<?

per

beginning

Defendant may appeal this judgment within 30 days to Court of Appeal in Salt Lake City^Utah.

Dated.
j
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CIRCUIT JUDGE
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Nathan Hult - 4704
Attorney for Defendant
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
Telephone: (801) 753-7400

-
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF LOGAN,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL AND
REQUEST FOR RECORD

vs.
Case No. 911001337

LOWELL CARLSEN,
Defendant.

TO THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY:
The Defendant hereby gives notice of his appeal from the
judgment and sentence entered on October 6, 1992.
You are hereby requested to prepare, certify and transmit to
the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah, with reference to the
Notice of Appeal filed herewith, the record in the above case,
prepared and transmitted as required by law, and the rules of said
Court, and to include in said record, the following documents:
ALL FILES AND TRANSCRIPTS PERTAINING TO THIS RECORD.
DATED this

H

day of November, 1992.

1*4**

Nathan Hult
Attorney for Defendant

^

Casa No.lLY
NOV 5 1992
\\

.our
LOWELL D. CARLSEN

'S3 FEB 4 PH 4 47

Defendant in Pro Se
720 North 400 East
Logan, Utah 8432]
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,
STATE OF UTAH,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Plaintiff(s) ,
-vsLOWELL D. CARLSEN
Case No.

911001337

Defendant.

I certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
Notice of Appeal filed by Nathan Hult on November 4, 1992 in
the above-entitled matter to Scott L. Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor,
located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah on this 4th day of
February, 1993.

,.

NATHAN 1IULT
Al IOHNI Y Al I AW
PHONF

(801)
fROI)
(801)

753-7400
7«i?753R
753-7447

OFFICE
HOME
FAX

I I O f J O H m 100 FAST
LOGAN UTAH 84321

March 11, 1992

Judge K. Roger Bean
437 Wasatch Drive
Layton, UT 84041
RE:

State of Utah v. Lowell Carlsen
Case No. 911001337

Dear Judge Bean:
Enclosed is a copy of Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss which we have filed with the court in the above noted case.
If the court declines to grant our Motion to Dismiss, a
conflict has arisen with the Sentencing date of March 30. Judge
Pat Brian has scheduled State of Utah vs. Steven James, a murder
trial, to begin on March 30 and continue for three weeks. Could
we reschedule this Sentencing date for either before that time or
after the trial concludes?
Thank you for your consideration of this matter.
Sincerely,

Nathan Hult
NH/sk
Enclosure
cc:

Scott Wyatt

FIRST

C I R C U I T

COURT ,

S T A T , E 0 r O i F o o U X A H -,

DC
CACHE COUNTY, LOGAN DEPARTMENT

ULL

60

nil iO i

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

LOGAN CITY
Plaintiff,
vs.

No.

911001337

Date

10-13-92

Judge

Bean

LOWELL D, CARLSEN
Defendant
MATTER:

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

At the sentencing herein on October 6, 1992, defense counsel
moved the court to dismiss the charge on the ground that
Defendant had not agreed to postpone sentencing beyond the 30
day period provided in Rule 22(a), URCrimP. That Rule
provides:
Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea,
unless the court, with the concurrence of the
defendant, otherwise orders.
The cases cited in the annotation following the Rule are to
the effect that the time fixed is directory, not jurisdictional .
But in any event, it is clear from a review of the judge's
trial notes that Defendant concurred in setting sentencing in
this case beyond the 30 day period. Because the sentencing
was to be by a visiting judge, various dates beyond the 30 day
limit were first discussed without objection from the defense,
but no date could be agreed on. It was the clerk's office
which actually set the date, and there can be no doubt it
cleared it with defense counsel's office first. On the date
for sentencing, defense counsel's secretary telephoned the
judge asking for a continuance because counsel was involved in
a trial in Salt Lake that day. She agreed to call again later

that day or the next, presumably to reset the matter for
sentencing. That call did not come.
In light of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
denied.

Judge

2

LOWELL D. CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
720 North 400 East
Logan, Utah 84321

'93 Mi 20 fin 3 08

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-vsLOWELL D. CARLSEN,

Case No. 911001337

Defendant.

NOTICE is hereby given that the above-named defendant,
Lowell D. Carlsen hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals
from the written Memorandum of Decision and Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss presented at sentencing.

Said written Memorandum

of Decision and Order denying Defendant's Motion was filed with the
Clerk of the above-entitled Court on the 28th day of December, 1992
and received by defense counsel on the 30th day of December, 1992.
(A copy attached hereto and made a part hereof).

The defendant

requests that this appeal be consolidated with the appeal currently
pending in the Utah Court of Appeals under case no. 920739-CA from

a Notice of Appeal filed within 30 days after the sentencing of
the defendant.

Judgment and sentence was imposed and entered on

the 6th day of October, 1992.
DATED this

//

clay of

January,

199

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Notices of Appeal to Scott L. Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor, Jocated
at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by
placing the same in a U.S. Mailbox on this /b^x

day of January, 1993.

1
2

CCUI:TY or CACHE, LOGAI: CITY DEPARTMENT

3

-ioCo-

4
LOGAN CITY,

)

5
Plaintiff,

)

Case No. 911001337

)
)

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
JUrY TRIAL

6
vs.
7

LOWELL D. CARLSEN,
Defendant.

8
g

)
)

/^/f^lQf^V
\^>%JJ |]
U

-oQo10
11

BE IT rJZJTIIEEREC that on the 16th day of

12

January, 1C-S2, the above-entitled action was held before

13

the HONORABLE RCHER BEAN, sitting as Judge in the above-

14

earned Court, and that the following proceedings were had.

15

-oCo-

16

A ? r E A R A H C E S

17

ITor the Ci-y.

CCCTT L. S7YATT
Logan City Prosecutor
2!! 5 !Torth Main
Logan, Utah
84321

For the Defendant:

NATHAN HULT
Attorney at Law
110 North 100 East
Logan, Utah
84321

j
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

j

PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R.
3241 SOUTH 4840 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH
84120
PHONE.
966-4862

1
2 I

State of Utah/City of Logan vs. Lowell D. Carlsen

3

Page

4

MOTION TO DISMISS EY MR. HUL1]

5

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENDANT
JERREN BARSON

6
7

|

Direct Examination by Mr. Hult
LOWELL D. CARLSEN

8
9

Direct Examination by Mr. Hult

7

10

Cross-Examination by Mr. Wyatt

13

11

Redirect Examination by Mr. Hult

15

Recross-Examination by Mr. Wyatt

22

12

DEFENDANT RESTS

13

25
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15
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16
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48
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50
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70
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1

w i t n e s s s t a n d , and was examined and t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s :

2

DIRECT EXAMINATION

3

3Y MR. liULT;

4

si

Would you p l e a s e s t a t e your name for the record?

5

A

I'm Jerren Barson.

6

Q

Okay.

7

the record?

8

A

3-a-r-s-o-n.

9

Q

Where do you reside?

10

A

Clarkston.

11

Q

Clarkston?

12

A

Utah.

13

w

Cache Valley, Utah?

14

A

Yeah.

15

Q

And how old are you?

16

A

Sixteen.

17

Q

Drawing to your attention an incident that

And would you s p e l l your l a s t name for

18

occurred on or about November 8th, 1991.

19

occasion to be present at Carlsen*s ga3 station and car

20

wash in the City of Logan?

Did you have

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And were you at that time acting in cooperation

23

with a law enforcement officer?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Who was that law enforcement officer?

5

1

A

Gil D — D u r a n d or whatever.

2

Q

Gil Durand?

3

A

Yeah.

4

Q

Is he the officer seated at the table next to the

5

prosecutor?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Did he make a request of you that you attempt to

8

buy tobacco at the Carlsen Gas and Car Wash?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Okay.

11

W e l l , yeah.
And did you in fact go to the Carlsen Gas

and Car Wash?

12

A

Yes.

13

g

And while you were there, did you meet Lowell

14

Carlsen, who is .seated here at the defense table?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Did you make a purchase of tobacco from him?

17 I

A

Uh huh (affirmative).

18
19

MR. HULT:

Okay. Those are the only questions I

have for this witness at this time, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

21 I

Mr. Wyatt, any questions?

22

MR* WYATT:

H o , not at this time.

23 I

THE COURT:

Not at this time?

24

You may step down.

25

it B-a-r?

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. D a r s o n — i s

1
2
3

I

M*. trw™?-

Vcur

7>-nay I object?

This is—{

I this i s conduct that occurred after the purchase and
surely i t ' s not relevant to entrapment.

4

These questions we1re leading into are a l l post-

5 I date the time of the time.
THE COURT;

6
7

aonor#

I 3imply—

Well, I can't t e l l for sure at this

I point whether or not they would cast—cast some--perhaps

8

some other evidance we have heard or might hear, in a light

9

that would have a.bearing.

10
11
12
13
14

I ' l l overrule i t at this time and you may go ahead\
Mr. Hult.
Q

(3y Mr, Hult)

Did you see where Officer Geier

went after he left?
A

Yes.

He ran up the s t r e e t , up where they had a—

15

they had a car, a police car parked about a half a block up

16

the street.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

On the north side of the street.

19

2

And did you see other individuals in that police

20
21

car after Officer Geier went up there?
A

Yes. Because after he had cited m e and everything,)

22

the police car c o m e — a f t e r I was cited and everything was

23

done, the police car come down this way.

24

put his head out the window and laughed at m e real loud.

25

Q

Okay.

Were t h e r e —

21

T h i s — M r . Duron

1

A

I c o u l d n ' t figure what he was laughing a t ne for,

2

I d i d n ' t see what was funny, what he'd done t h a t was so

3

funny.

4

Q

Were there other individuals in the car?

5

A

Yes. There was a person on the other side. The

6

only one I recognized is him, but there was one on the other

7

side and one in the back seat.

8

Q

9

Okay.

Thank you.

MR. IIULT;

I have no further questions.

10

THE WITKESS: Okay.

11

THE COURT: Thank you.

12

Further cross?

13

MR. KYATI: Yes.

14

RECROSS-SXAHIKATXOK

15

16
17

Q

This particular individual, you indicated you had

a hard time remembering exactly who he was for sure.

18

A

Yes. All I can remember is the appearance—

19

Q

And™

20

A

— a t the time, that he was old, because I do not

21

sell—

22

Q

Now—

23

A

—cigarettes to minors.

24

Q

You do not sell cigarettes—

25

A

No.

1

— 1* CCUn*". — 1 U C 1 3 3 7 , Logan City vs. Carlsen#

2

and that all of our jurors are present.

3

present <*nd loth counsel arc present.

4

Mr. Carlsen is

Let's ^ee# members of the jury, I think our next

5

3tep appropriately, is to have you stand and receive an

6

oath from the clerk to well and truly try the case, and

7

would you do that, please, stand and raise your right

8

hands.

9

(Whereupon, the jury panel was duly sworn

10

by the clerk of the Court.)

11
12
13

THE COURT;

Thank you.

And you nay be seated

again.
Judge Judkins follows a procedure in his cases

14

of giving some of the instructions to the jury preliminarily,]

15

that i s , ahead of the evidence, and I ' D going to follow

16

that procedure this morning.

17

These instructions that I'm going to read to you,

18

you will have v/ith you when you <jo to the jury room, you

19

nay refer to then again, and I ' l l try to read them to you

20

in c. way that won't put you to sleep, but we'll just ask

21

you to be as attentive to them as you can.

22

Members of the jury, you've been selected and

23

sworn in as the jury to try the case set forth above.

24

This i s a criminal case.

25

The Information reads as follows:

45

Circuit Couxt,

1

bach in th2 Court shortly.

2

(thereupon, the jury was

3

excused from the

courtroom.)

4

THE COURT;

I believe i f y o u ' r e able to take t h i s

5

jury to the jury room, j u s t leave us on the record and we 1 11

6

be a l l r i g h t .

L e t ' s do t h a t .

TT

7

,. e have good security—thank you.

8

'Je have good

s e c u r i t y in t h i s b u i l d i n g .

9

The record w i l l show that our j u r o r s have l e f t

10

the courtrooia.

11

Mr. Carlsen and both counsel are present.

Mr. h u l t , would you l i k e to iapeak to your motion.

12

Zo t h a t we're sure the record picks i t up, our conference

13

at the bench had t h i s microphone facing away from you,

14

your notion i s — w e l l , why d o n ' t you go ahead and r e s t a t e

15

it?

16

MR. IICLT:

Yes, your Honor.

The defendant has

17

been charged under City ordinance 9.24.040, sale of

18

tobacco to a person under iS--under 19 years of age.

19

There is--and it has been charged as a Class E

20

nisdemeanor as provided by City ordinance

21

THE CCURT:

22

Excuse r;,e.

1.16.010—

Let me interrupt you for

just a moment.

23

Do you need to communicate with the bailiff?

24

THE CLZRK:

I did.

THE CODST:

All r i g h t .

25

I

43

They're i n your care then?

laiLi you.

"* 11 r^jnt.
Please jo aheaJ # Ar.
dR* dULT;

dult.

That latter ordinance providing that

ail violations Tjr which no lesser penalty is provided in
5 j the municipal code 4ili be a Class 2 misdemeanor, and the
Information shots

6

in fact that he is charged with a Class B

7 I .ai a demeanor.
8

9

|

There is a state statute that covers the same
offense of furnishing tobacco to a person under the age of

10 I 13, Utah Code 7 6-10-104.
11

That particular statute raakes it

a. Class C raisdeuoancr on the first offense, Class L

12

usdesnaanor on the second offense, and Class A raisdeneanor

13

.n any subsequent offense.

14

I*o particular nuraLer of offenses charged in the

15

Information which i s , in and of itself, a significant

16

defect; but in t h e — t h i s particular case, where no second

17

or third offenjo ^3 charjed, it can be no more than a

18

Class C misdemeanor under the State Jtatute.

19

!Icw, what io ;ou lo when you 'rave two s t a t u — a

20

ctate statute and a City ordinance that are in conflict?

21

Under the State of Allgood v s . Larson, 5 43 P. 2d I3C, a

22

case dealing with a conviction of trespassing under a Salt

23

Lake City ordinance, the Utah Supreme Court jaid that t h e —

24

that the City ordinance xs void.

25

in this particular case, the provision that the

4S

V.-0. Lmf

iksiS

**

»n~ i ir.

A.

1

rj, -I

<*-

ordinance with which they're charging

the defendant Lz voi*"' because itfr in direct conflict with
<> W

the State

X . Wfc f

. u u t U t -•
» ...» W

w

*pn* „

W«

Thank you.

Mr. Uyatt?

Your Honor, if this is a concern, the
legislature has jiven city prosecutors the authority to
^rosecute Cirect ly und.or State lav, and I would just move to
^nend the Infom ation.

The lanauage is the same under

Loth ordinances, and move to amend the Information v;hich I
can do by interlineation to charge the defendant with
violating Utah Code 76-10-10 4.
THE COUHT:

All right.

Thank you.

Could the problem be cured, Mr. Hult, dimply by
having hin amend it to ~,how a Cla3s C misdemeanor?
!1R. IIULT; Your Honor, we are opposed to the
amendment in this case charging him with a violation of a
3tate law rather -han a City ordinance, albeit that the—
.hey cover -he :ame ground or the same material.
I think at this late late, that an amendment is
improper.

In addition, I think that given the fact that

they've choaen to proceed under the City ordinance rather
than the Ttate statute is another reason that they should
not be permitted to amend at this time.
THE CCU2T:

"Tell, let me ask one other question.

If—if defendant--if the trial proceeds and the defendant
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1

were to be convicted, if the penalty were simply limited,

2

the sentence limited to a Class C misdemeanor sentence,

3

would that cure the problem?

4

5

MR. HULT:

Allgood vs. Larson is that—

6
7

THE COURT:

Do you have the year of that case,

Mr. Hult?

8

MR. HULT:

9

THE COURT:

10

Your Honor, the—the way that I read

MR. HULT;

Yes. It1s 197 6.
All right.
It's a decision by Justice Maughan.

11

The specific language that they Juote from the McQuillin is-

12

well, just to back up a moment.

13

brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and—

14

and the Court said that the conviction was invalid. And

15

they quote McQuillin as saying if the ordinance penalty

16

conflicts with that of the general law of the state

17

governing the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void.

18

The charter ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of the

19

State law.

20

THE COURT:

Under the—the matter was

Well, t h a t ' s t h e q u e s t i o n I was j u s t

21

addressing, when i t says the penalty is void, that's

22

different than saying the ordinance is void.

23

MR. HULT:

I t i s ; however, in this particular

24

case, they didn't just overturn the punishment, but they

25

overturned the conviction.
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1

A

Ho, 1 d i d n ' t .

2

g

liow did you get his

3

A

ile just looked up when I got there.

4

He was just—

could like see both way3.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

He was s i t t i n g .

7

Q

Okay.

8

attention?

9

A

10

Q

11

attention?

Was he s i t t i n g or standing f

at that time?

You d i d n ' t have to say anything to get his

No.

After you had asked him for Camel Lights, you say

that he asked you if you were 19 years of age?

12

A

13

Q

And what did you do then?

14

A

I did not answer him.

15

Q

You d i d n ' t answer?

16

A

Huh uh (negative).

17

Q

what did he do next?

18

A

Then he just reached down and got them.

19

Q

Without asking you any more questions?

20

A

Yeah.

22

Q

why do you think he asked you if you were 19?

23

A

To—I don't know.

24

Q

The r e s t of the sales took place inside t h a t

21

25

Yes.

I d i d n ' t answer when he a3ked me i f I was

19.

night, you say?
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1

CROSS-EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. iiULT;

3

Q

4

with the brown suit jacket, you 1 re referring to the dark

5

brown rather than the light brown?

6
7
8

Q

In y o u r — d i d you indicate that you did not have a

A

11

I'd say yours is tan.

I saw him approach the shed and it was clear that

he was on the other side of the shed, but I w a s — I did not

12

have visual contact during the actual transaction, no,

13

Q

14

Okay.

When you came, was it minutes later or less

than a minute later after Jerren had made the purchase and

15

told Carlsen what had happened,

16

and he was extremely upset

when he heard that?

17
18
19
20
21

A

Would you ask that again?

Q

Okay.

A

I'm not aure I understand.

Q

It sounds l i k e — I think I asked you a compound

question.

22

25

Correct.

the shed?

10

24

A

view of Jerren at the window, but you only had a view of

9

23

I assume that when you're saying the individual

|

A

Yeah, you did.

Q

How soon after Jerren made his purchase did you

show up at the window?
A

W i t h i n — w i t h i n a minute.
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U

Okay,

And you told Mr. Car Is en that you were

there because he had just sold somebody—tobacco to somebody
who was under age?

5

I

A

Correct.

Q

And did he immediately get quite upset when he

6

heard that?

7

A

8
9

Well, h e — h e got on the defensive, if you would,

as far as his conversation went.
J

Q

Okay.

Now, what he told you specifically was

10

that the person looked 19, that hefd asked him three times

11

if he was 19, and that he said he was 19?

12 I

A

That 1 s correct.

13

Q

Do you recall him going beyond that and telling

14

you that in fact he'd asked the kid what month and what year

15

he was born in?

16 I

A

So.

17

2

Okay.

18

I don't recall that.
Now, when you said—you said you asked him

if he had requested an I.D. and Mr. Carlsen said he had not?

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

You would agree, would you not, with Todd Barson,

21

| that the State law does not state that a seller of tobacco

22

I has to require an I.D.?

2

3 |

A

That the law—say that again.

Q

Okay.

24

I

25

I seller of tobacco to require an I.D. prior to a sale, does

The State statute does not require a
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1

it?

2

A

I believe that's true, ye3.

Q

Okay.

Is it not true that Mr. Carlsen asked you

to 3ee thi3 individual that h a d — t h a t had just allegedly
5

7

| bought the tobacco from him?

I

8
9

I

A

I do not recall that, either.

Q

What was your purpose in going back to the car?

A

To talk with Officer Duron.

Q

Okay.

Is it not true, though, that before you

10

went back to that car, CarIsen said there is no w a y that

11

that kid who had bought the tobacco from him was less than

12 I 19 years of age, he looked 19 years of age, and he wanted
13

to see him?

14

A

No.

I n e v e r — d o n ' t remember any c o n t e x t of

that

15

kind—

16

g

Okay.

A

— i n the conversation.

Q

Do you recall any time that evening, either prior

17

18

I

19

to going back to Officer Duron's vehicle, or when you came

20

back again and issued the citation, Mr.--telling Mr. Carlsen,|

21

you can see him in court?

22

A

I do recall making a statement to him because o f —

23

because of the way the conversation was eventually going,

2

that after I made a determination to issue the citation,

4

25

I informed him t h a t — t h a t he would need to take it before

1

the judge and before the C o u r t —

2

J

Okay.

3

A

— i f he felt that it was unjust.

4

Q

But in that context, is it not correct that

5

Mr. Carlsen did not believe the person that he had sold to

6

looked anything less than 19 years of age, and wanted to

7

see him right then and there, see what he looked like?

8
9

A

W e l l , his initial argument, as I stated, w a s —

was to the effect that his basis for selling it was that he

10

thought he was 19, he looked 19 in his judgment, and that

11

he'd a s k e d — m a d e inquiry three times as to his age.

12

stated to m e that Jerren had stated he was 19.

13
14

N o w , in talking with Jerren at the time, prior to
making c o n t a c t —

15

Q

We I l -

ls

A

— h e had denied that.

M

Q

Okay.

1

And he

3ut getting back to my question.

You, a.t

8

some point, indicated that Mr. Carlsen could see him in

19

Court a n d —

20

A

N o , I never said that.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

I would not have said that.

23

Q

You don't at this point recall Mr. Carlsen

Y o u — y o u — I take it y o u —
I did n o t —

24

asking to see this person that had bought the tobacco

25

that night?
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1

A

2
3
4

No.

I do n o t .

T h a t ' s not t o say he d i d n ' t a s k , b u t I d o n ' t
recall.
Q

Okay.

5

MR. 2IULT;

6

THE COURT:

7

Further direct?

8

MR. WYATT;

No, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

You may s t e p down, Mr. G e i e r .

10

MR. WYATT;

Your Honor, i f I could have j u s t 30

12

THE COURT:

You may.

13

(Off t h e r e c o r d . )

14

MR. /7YATT:

The C i t y would r e s t a t t h i s t i m e .

15

THE COURT:

All right.

U

16

I d o n ' t have any f u r t h e r

questions.

Thank you.

seconds.
^ ? e f l l go o f f t h e r e c o r d .

W e ' l l go back on t h e

r e c o r d , i f w e 1 r e not a l r e a d y .

17

The CiLy has r e s t e d .

18

:ir. H u l t , you may go ahead.

19

MR. HULT:

Your Honor, I wonder if, at this time,

20

it would be appropriate for raa to renew ny motion that I

21

have made previously/ or if the Court would wish us to

22

proceed at this time.

23

THE COURT:

Let's see.

Maybe it's appropriate to

24

take a recess•

25

need to address that legal question, and then we'll take our

Let's excuse the jury and take the time we
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1
2

don't ail -waste our tine, that's maybe the best way to do
it*

3

Does that sound all right, Mr. Uult?

4
5
6
7
8

MR. HOLT:

whether I did previously, is to place on the record our
objection to the motion to amend.

THE COURT:
MR. HULT:

11

THE COURT;

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

— t o the motion to amend.
All right.

The record will show your

Mr. Wyatt, is there anything you want to add to
what we've said?

15

17

All right.

objection, and I've treated that as if it had been stated.

13

16

I think we discussed it,

but I f m not 3ure if I stated outright that we object—

10

14

The

only thing 1 want to do because I 1 in uncertain as to

9

12

That sounds fine, your Honor.

MR. WYATT:
said.

Ko.

I think that everything's been

Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.

The Court now grants the

prosecution's motion to amend, to substitute the State of
Utah in place of Logan City as the prosecuting agency, and
grants the motion to amend to refer to the State statute as
the governing legal provision, specifically Section—can't
find it here.

Thank you.

76-10-104 of the Utah Code, and

grants the motion to identify it as a Class C misdemeanor.
And the Court does that, as I say, for the
purpose of getting the issue to the jury in the proper form,

jan.

at least tentatively, and then if that's—if that's not
correct, a later decision by the Court will remedy that.
If it—if it can be done, and ti's correct, we won't have
wasted the jury's tine and the witnesses' and counsel's
and everyone's time.

So, I think that's the best way to

proceed, and the Court now grants that motion.
The Court continues and keeps under advisement
defendant's motion, however, to dismiss, because of the
conflict between the ordinance and the State statute.
MR. rfULT; One matter, other matter of clarification*

Does the—the amendment also include changing the

plaintiff?
THE COURT:

I think I did say that, yes, that the

motion includes substituting the State of Utah in place of
Logan City as the prosecuting agency.
I1R. r,?YATT: One question that I would have, your
Honor.

You indicated you were reserving the motion to

dismiss based on the inconsistency.
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative).

Well, I guess

what I'm saying is, I'm not sure you have the right to
amend at this point.
MR. WYATT: Oh.
THE COURT:

I'm not sure but what the motion of

the defendant is well taken, that you have a conflict here
between the City ordinance and the State statute and it's
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1

too late to cure it.

2

position is; that the jury's been sworn and defendant's in

3

jeopardy, and I think what he's saying i s , if that's a bad

4

approach to the prosecution, then it can't be brought

5

again.

6

I think that's what Mr. Hult's

I suppose that would be your argument.
MR. HULT:

Y e s , if there was a refiling, but

7

more particularly, at this point in tine, that that one

8

statute giving them authority to prosecute State statutes

9

doesn't apply to something that occurred before January 1st,

10

in addition to the prejudice that the defendant155 suffering

11

at this late stage o f the proceedings.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

You're not abandoning any

13

position that the defendant nay be prejudiced by the

14

amendment at this stage.

I—

15

MR. HULT;

16

THE COURT;

17

MR. xlULT:

1

THE COURT:

19

Well, l e t ' s go ahead and take our r e c e s s , and then

8

N o . N o . No, w e ' r e —
I imagine you're s t i l l
We c e r t a i n l y a r e n ' t
All r i g h t .

claiming that?

abandoning t h a t .

All r i g h t .

Than}; you.

20

ifra going to i n s t r u c t the jury t h a t we've changed the name

21

of the case to t h a t extent,

and go ahead and f i n i s h up.

22

MR. WYATT:

Ckay.

23

THE COURT:

All right. Court's in recess.

24

(Whereupon, the recess was taken.)

25

(Whereupon, discussion on jury instructions
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1

asked f o r - - I

2

Q

3

brand?

4

5

A

to

c a n ' t remember what brand i t was, no*

Ckay.

Yes.

May—might he have asked for a p a r t i c u l a r

Probably l i d .

I d i d n ' t pay any a t t e n t i o n

it.

6

Q

W h a t — w h y did you ask him if he was 19?

7

A

/Jell, I just had been asking everyone, unless

8

they were 40.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

When I asked hin how old he was?

11

Q

Yes.

12

A

He said he was 19.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

He looked between 22, 23 years old, to m e .

15

Q

Did you observe the individual that w a s — i d e n t i f i e 4

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

What did he respond to you?

How old did he look to you?

himself as Jerren, that testified here earlier?
A

Yes.

I looked at him here in the Court, uh huh

(affirmative) .
Q

Did he appear any different to you that night than

he appears in Court now?
A

Certainly did, he seemed like he was a lot older,

he looked a lot higher than he did here.
Q

Did you notice anything different about him in

particular that night?
A

Well, it looked like he had a little growth,
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1

actually a little growth of beard there or something, a

2

little like ha hadn't shaved or something.

3

Q

Did you notice anything else different about him?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

His hair seemed to be a little different, a lot

7

Just--

different than it was today, seemed to be a shorter cut and—|

8

Q

What happened after you asked him if he was 19?

9

A

Well, then I asked him what month and year he

10
11
12

was born, and he—•
Q

Okay.

Let m e ..back up a minute.

He did respond

when you asked him if he was 19?

13

A

Yes, uh huh

14

Q

Do you recall exactly what he said?

15

A

He said he was 19.

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

You mean when I asked him how old he was?

18

Q

Yeah.

19

A

He said, "I'm 19".

20

Q

What happened then after you asked him what month

21

(affirmative).

Do you remember what hi3 words were?

and year he was born?

22

A

He didn't bat an eye, he said December • 71.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

Well, if t h e y ' r e — i f there is anything wrong,

25

Tfhy did you ask him that question?

they're surely not going to remember exsctly what year; they
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*aight say '73, '74, most people lon't know.
Q

Okay.

What happened after he responded to that

question?
A

I just told hira you1 re almost 20 years old then

and he said—he nodded his head, that he—like that.
Q

Okay.

And then what—what after you-—what

happened after you uiade that comment to hira?
A

Well, then, I just give hini the cigarettes, sold

him the cigarettes.
Q

Okay.

You had earlier been informed, possibly two

aonths earlier/ of the law of selling tobacco to minors?
A

Gh, yes, I've known for 42 years that they've got

to be 19 to buy cigarettes.
Q

Okay.

A

I t was n o t h i n g new t o me, I know t h e y ' v e g o t t o be

^

«*nd do you r e c a l l lir. 3 a r s o n coming around to

A

Yes, uh huh

Q

And ^ave you a little sign to put up in your

13.

you?
(affirmative).

22
23
24
25
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A

Well, then an officer just a minute or two minutes J

three minutes, four minutes, an officer came around to the
window.
Q

Okay.

Kas that—do you recall if that was the

Game Officer Geier that testified here?
A

Same one.

Officer Geier, uh huh (affirmative).

Q

What did he say when he came around?

A

He said that I'd just sold cigarettes to a minor.

Q

What did you respond?

A

I told him it wasn't a minor, that guy was 19.

I asked him first, I says, was it that person that just
left here?

And he says yes, and I says, that person is 19.

Q

f

A

He said that he wasn't 19, and I says, well, I

.Jhat did he say then?

told him he was as big as he was, looked ^ust the sane age
as he was.
Q

What happened after that?

A

Well, then they—he—I said—just insisting that

he was 19, I told him about, that I'd a3ked him the month
and year and all about, so he says, jU3t a minute, and he
left and went up the street.

And then hef a few rrinutes

later, he came back, and he says, the boy said he—you
didn't ask him his age.
Q

Had you asked him his age?

A

The boy?
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1

u

2

A

3

Q

What did you—what did you next ask the officer,

5

A

Well, then, I —

6

Q

Or I should say, did you rr.ake a request of the

4

7
8
9
10

Yeah.
Yes.

then?

officer then?
A

Yes. I requested that he bring the boy back, I

v/anted to see him standing to the side of the officer to-—
'cause I tola him he was just as big as he was.

11

C

Uh huh (affirmative).

12

A

Every b i t as b i g , and j u s t - - l o o k e d j u s t as o l d .

13

Q

When you asked him to b r i n g t h e kid hack, what

14

did he say?

15

A

He s a y s , You can see him i n Court.

16

Q

Okay.

17
18
19
20

Lack for you to see what he looked l i k e t h a t night?
A

Ko, he said he wouldn't b r i n g hira back, he j u s t

said, you can see him in Court.
Q

21
22

And I take i t he d i d n ' t b r i n g the kid

Okay.
MR. HULT : Thank you.

questions

23

THE COURT:

24

You ntay cross-examine.

25

I have no further

Thank you.

#
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1

2

CROSS~EXAI:II:ATIQN
3 Y MR. VJYATT:

3

4

Q

If I understand it f you "lid sell cigarettes to

t h i s individual?

5

A

Yes,

6

Q

And from your—what you've indicated t o us, your

7

conversation with him was limited to a couple s h o r t

8

questions?

9

A

J u s t a few questions.

10

Q

¥ou asked him, How old are you?

11

A

Yes,

12

Q

And what you're t e l l i n g us i s t h a t he answered

14

A

Yes#

15

Q

And then you asked him what his birthday was?

16

A

I asked him month and year of his

17

Q

And why did you do that?

18

A

J u s t to—

19

Q

Double-check?

20

A

--double-check.

21

Q

T o make sure?

22

A

That that was how old he was.

23

Q

But you thought he looked 21 or 22 or 23?

24

A

Yeah, along i n there, uh huh (affirmative), 22,

13

25

19?
sir.

23.
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birth.

1
2

CROSS~EXAI:II;ATION
BY MR. :;YATT :

3
4

Q

this

If I: understand i t , you did s e l l

c i g a r e t t e s to

individual?

5

A

Yes,

6

Q

And from your—what you 1 v e i n d i c a t e d t o u s , your

7

c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h him was

8

questions?

l i m i t e d t o a couple a hort

9

A

J u s t a few q u e s t i o n s .

10

Q

You asked him, How old are you?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And what you're

14

A

Yes, sir.

15

Q

And then you asked hin what his birthday was?

16

A

I asked him month and year of his birth.

17

Q

And why did you do that?

18

A

Just t o —

19

Q

Double-check?

20

A

—double-check,

21

Q

To make sure?

22

A

That that was how old he was.

23

Q

But you thought he looked 21 or 22 or 23?

24

A

Yeah, along in there, uh huh (affirnative), 22,

13

25

t e l l i n g us i s t h a t he answered

19?

23.
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1
2

THE COURT:

All right.

It13 in the hands of the

jury.

3

Court's in recess.

4

(Whereupon, the recess was taken.)

5

THE COURT;

We've returned to File 911001337,

6

Layton City against—pardon me, Logan City, also the State

7

of Utah, against Lowell D. Carlsen.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Our jurors have returned, they've indicated that
they've reached a verdict.

I ' l l ask the bailiff

retrieve the verdict, bring i t to the bench.

to

Thank you.

The record should also reflect that Mr. Carlsen
and both counsel are present.
The verdict i s in proper form.

I ' l l ask the

clerk to read the verdict.
THE CLERK; TCe, the jurors in the above case,

16

find the defendant, Lowell Carlsen, guilty of selling

17

tobacco to a minor, a Class C misdemeanor.

18

Jenkins, foreperson.

19

THE COURT:

20

Members of the jury, you've taken time, as we

Signed, Troy

Thank y o u .

21

said before, out from busy l i v e s , to make i t possible for

22

our system to work.

23

We express thanks to you.

We're going to address some sentencing considera-

24

tions and motion considerations that have arisen previously.

25

We excuse you now.

You also get to keep that large check,

111

but you had to work harder for it.
service in this case.

Ke thank you for your

Thank you very much.

Counsel, that moves us on to the next stage.
l.r. Hultr would you be willing to postpone sentencing
while the Court considers the questions that you've raised
in your earlier motions that are under advisement?
MR. HULT:

We would prefer postporing

sentencing,

would we not, until the Judge has had a chance to rule on
the motions?
MR. CAELSEK: Yes.
THE COURT;
right.

I think that might be the best. All

Thank you.
Is that agreeable, Mr. Wyatt, t o —
MR. WYATT:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

— t h e City, State, whichever it turns

out to be.
MR. WYATT:

Whoever I am.

THE COURT; As—whoever you are; has no objection
to that, Ifm sure.
All right.

Let's see, so that we don't just

absolutely lose it, if I set a date for sentencing and then
get back and get busy on this, maybe thatfs the best thing
to do. What, 60 days from now, and I don't expect it to
take that long, but let me give you a sentencing date, if
that's all right, Mr. Hult.

112

What dates normally would the Judge do—use for
sentencing here?
THE CLERK:

(Inaudible)

THE COURT:

All right.

THE CLERK:

Would you like me t o —

THE COURT;

Yes, would you do that?

Sometimes that is a good

day.

Let's look

at something five or six weeks away, toward the end of
February.
I ' v e got one o r two t h i n g s under a d v i s e m e n t , b u t
I want t o move r i g h t o u t on t h i s o n e , I d o n ' t want i t

to

d r a g , so I ' l l t r y t o g e t a t i t and s e e where we a r e on those
l e g a l p o i n t s , and what I ' l l do i s i s s u e a w r i t t e n memorandum
of d e c i s i o n and send c o u n s e l a copy of i t .
got a d d r e s s e s i n t h e

I assume we've

file?

MR. WYATT:

Should have, we—

THE COURT;

Mr. H u l t , P o s t O f f i c e Box 543, 110

Itorth 100 E a s t , Logan.
MR. HULT:
THE COURT:

Yes.
And, let's see, Mr. Wyatt, I'm not

sure I've got anything with your—
MR. WYATT:

My—my objection to motions to

THE COURT;

Oh, yes, that'll be in here. Okay.

dismiss.

Hight.

255 North Main, Post Office 527. All right.
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I I

p r o c - E D i r r a

2

3 I

THE COURT;

'le'll go ahead with the natter before

4

the Court, *.;hich is a sentencing, and ';he Clerk reminds m e ,

5

Mr. Hult, that I did n o t — w i t h respect to the two motions

6

that were before the Court at the conclusion of the trial,

7

I did not issue a formal opinion and I think I had indicated

8

to you by setting the sentencing earlier, that the Court's

9

decision would be consistent with that, that is with a —

10

imposing a sentence; and so perhaps it is appropriate at

II

this time that I go ahead and briefly announce a decision

12

on those two motions.

13

The Court had sortie reservation at the tine that

14

the prosecution move to amend, that t h e y — t h a t it needed to

15

do that, that that was an appropriate motion and it raised

16

a question, I think, at that time, and then of course, kept

17

under advisement that motion and the defense motion to

18

disraiss.

19

And you have since, and I appreciated your doing

20

that, you have since filed with the Court a memorandum of

21

law referring to the Allgood case and to some other

22

authorities, and I've considered those and actually done

23

considerable research in February and March on this question

24

and was prepared to state at the bench, as I ani now, at the

25

time of sentencing, the Court's decision o n those two

2

1

motions, and then of course, that 3entencing was continued

2

and the case kinda got into the backwaters and didn't get

3

back on the main track, and so it came to my attention the

4

other lay and I asked the clerk to reset it.

5

Is there any question you have that, before we

6

go to sentencing or any comment you'd like to make on any

7

of the matters before the Court imposes sentence?

8

MR. HULT:

Your Honor, I do not know whether

9

:ir. Carlsen would wish to take an appeal, but it seems

10

that, and particularly where one of the issues that we

11

raised is an issue of Constitutional proportion, that some

12

findings a n d — a n d conclusions be entered.

13

prepare those for the Court.

14

We'd be glad to

l think I might need the Court's guidance a

15

little bit in that, and I wonder if this might be an

16

appropriate time for m e just to ask several questions that

17

I have in that regard.

18

THE COURT;

All right.

And you're welcome to do

19

that.

20

and maybe the prosecution i3 entitled to some input at this

21

point; but let m e have you go ahead and state the questions

22

that you have.

23

can address those even right here at this point.

24
25

It's perhaps my fault that the prosecutor isn't here

I'll make notes on those, and see if we

MR. HULT;

Your Honor, I believe that with regards

to the first issue that v e raised that the substantial rightd

1

of the defendant were prejudiced by the amendments, both

2

charging a State offense rather than a City offense and

3

changing the party frort being the City of Logan to the

4

plaintiff being the State of Utah, that 4;ho Court finds

5

that those do not substantially prejudice the rights of the

6

defendant.

7

THE COURT:

Yes,

I f i n d t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e we

8

followed at the time of t r i a l did not substantially prejudice)

9

defendant's rights.

10

Let me comment on that if I may.

As I say, I had

11

some question in my mind whether or not the prosecution

12

needed to m a k e — t o move to amend to prosecute in the name of

13

the State and took under advisement that motion.

14

The pleadings, I think, at the time the jury was

15

instructed did reflect the State of Utah.

16

tentative decision; what I mean i s , we had to do one or the

17

other.

1

be reflective of a decision to grant the prosecution's

19

motion to amend.

8

20

That was a

But that was not--the Court did not intend that to

And as I indicated earlier, the Court has

21

concluded that the appropriate thing to do here is both to

22

deny Logan City's motion to amend to prosecute in the State

23

of Utah and to deny defendant's motion to dismiss.

24

perhaps our discussion here ought to address the questions

25

that the defense has in light of those two decisions.

And

1

In other word*, I didn't t h i n k — I

felt somewhat

2

cure that t h e — t h a t the prosecution needed to amend; never-

3

tneless, w e went ahead and in the event that notion was

4

granted, the pleadings were denominated

5

Utah, but the Court by this decision denying Logan*s motion

6

to amend really makes it appropriate that the pleadings

7

should have remained in Logan

8

think defendant's been prejudiced by t h a t — t h a t change to

9

the State of Utah, and in effect, it w a s — a s I say, you had

10

to do one or the other, and I really hadn't made a decision

11

on that motion.

12

ahead and put them in the State of Utah.

13

in the State of

City's name, but I don't

So, the clerk was simply instructed to go

MR. HOLT;

The State had two motions.

The first

14

Leing amending the charge changing it from the City

15

ordinance to a charge under the State statute, although the

16

charging language remained the same, except that it was

17

changed from a Class B misdemeanor, or the amendment was to

18

amend from a Class 3 misdemeanor to a Class C.

19

motion granted to that limited extent?

20

THE COURT:

No.

21

MR. HULT:

Okay.

22

THE COURT;

!

?as that

I t h i n k — I think that the City's

23

motion to amend was unnecessary and for that reason, and

24

of course, you called to the attention of the Court and

25

Logan City's counsel that the State amendment had made the

1

same offense a Class C misdemeanor, and I f n very much

2

aware of that*

3
4
5

Mr, *Iult, rny reading of the Allgood case indicates
and I think in your memorandum you corrnctly stated this,
I at the time of trial, it was not correctly stated.

My notes

6

reflect that the argument was that the ordinance is void*

7

And then in your memorandum, I think you nore accurately

8

stated that it's the penalty of the ordinance that's void

9

under the Allgood decision*

10

And that is consistent with other cases the Court

11

has looked at, back i n — i n February and March, and I could

12

cite some of those to you, if it would be of help.

13

see if I can find this research note here*

14
15

For example, in State against Lancaster, a Utah
case decided in 1383, at 765 P*2d 872, the defendant there

16 I was charged with aggravated assault by a prisoner.
17
18

Let me

wrong statute was cited.

The

It was corrected by interlineation

The appellate court, in this case, the Utah

19

Supreme Court, held that the charge, both before and after

20

the amendment was the same, it was aggravated assault by a

21

prisoner; that only the statutory reference was changed,

22

the text of the Information was not altered and there was

2

no prejudice to defendant in that case in preparation for

3

2

*

25

trial, as evidenced by the trial record*
And the Court went on to state that the amendment

1
2
3

actually reduced tne severity of the charge, which of
course, wasn't necessarily favorable, as I recall, to the
defendant, but it didn* t prejudice nim.

4
5
6
7

In—chare's another case, ctate. against Colston,
C-o-l-s~t~o-n, it's a Utah decision in 1364, at 396 P.2d
405.

an overweight truck on the road.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

In that case, the defendant was charged with having

lie was convicted in the Price City Court, it was
affirmed in the District Court; but at the District Court
.level, the Court amended the statute to refer to a different
statute that was not before the Court in the City Court in
Price.
It happened that the statute the District Court
used still was not the correct statute or correct section.
The appellate court heldf again thn Utah Supreme Court
held that, citing earlier decisions, *:hat a nisnaiiung of
the statute would not void the Information where there is a
sufficient detailing of facts that constitute the offense
in the body of the Information, so that the defendant is
fully apprised of the nature of the charge against him.
The Court cited cases there, and I've looked at
cases from other states.

There1s a case, Richfield City

against Walker that I think is pertinent, that's a Utah
Court of Appeals decision in 1990. The citation is 790
P.2d 87, in which the Court, in language that, although it's

1

not our same fact jituuticn, i ndic ates th at the—t.he

2

proceeding on the Information such as it ^*;as here in this

3

case, the Court infers# Z :;ues s is v/hat I should z ay, from

4

the Richfield vs. talker case, the Cour t Lr.fers t!"lat the

5

procedure here is the appropriate procedure.

6

We have other cases sayi ng that the Legi.slature

7

can authorize cities to legia!.ate on subjects wit!-lin the

8

purview of the State laws, and I think naybe there's no

9

dispute about that.

10

Certainly in Code Section 75-10-104, the State

11

statute makes this a Class C misdemeanor.

12

conclusion from considering all of these decisions and what

13

occurred at the trial court level during the trial, con-

14

cludes that if the Court sentences Mr. Carlsen within the

15

parameters of the Class C statute, that he is not prejudiced

16

And that's what I intend to *o at this tine, and no I

17

believe that the fact that it lenoiainated a Class P

18

misdemeanor i3 not prejudicial to defendant.

19
20
21

But the Court's

Nov;, that's probably the long answer to your
question and maybe you have some more, b u t —
MR. HULT;

Your Honor, I believe in light of

22

denying the City's motion to amend, then that the second

23

and third issues that we had raised become irrelevant or

24

beside the point.

25

the amendments that had been requested by the City.

Those issues were raised on the basis of

1
2

THE COURT;

Yes.

I think that*3 probably c o r r e c t

procedurally.

3

MR. HULT:

The only other issue that w e have

4

then that we want to address before th3 Court proceeds with

5

sentencing i s — a n d here again, I should say w e appreciate

6

the Court 1 s care and concern with the issues that w e have

7

raised,

8
9

W e don't specifically recall waiving the right to
be sentenced within 30 days, a n d — a n d believe that without

10

having waived that right to sentence within 30 days, that

11

the Court should consider dismissing the charge against

12

Mr. Carlsen rather than proceeding with sentence.
TH

13

S COURT;

I can't specifically rexnenber, but I

14

thought that at the time w e set the sentencing originally

15

for March 30th that we discussed that delay and I thought

16

that the defense agreed to that.

17
18

MR. HOLT:
that, your Honor.

I don't have a specific nenory on
I—

19

THE COURT:

Let me sec if ny notes show anything.

20

MR. HULT;

Mr. Carlsen, this morning when he came

21

to Court, said that he couldn't remember it, and therefore--

22

therefore, we're raising that question*

23
24
25

THE COURT;

We can go eff the record for just a

moment •
(Off the record.)

1
2

THE COURT; ::r. Iluic, I've looked at :iy notes, and
I can't see anything one way or the other here, but it kinda

3 J rings a bell in :vy aind that we did talk about that, because

4

I think we set the Ilarch 30th date for -jntencing at the

5 I tirae of the trial, at the conclusion; and of course, that
6
7

would have keen beyond the 30 -lays at that time.
But in any event, ny suggestion is that I listen

8

to the tapee or ask one of the clerks to listen to the

9

tapes and we'll find out what was done at that tine, and

10

that w e proceed with sentencing this norning, suiject to

11

your motion, which I'll take under advisement.

12

looks like it's a well-taken notion, then I'll vacate that

13

sentencing and grant the notion.

14

!1R. HULT;

15

THE COURT;

Okay.

And if it

We would appreciate that.

Dut that would save everybody a

16

trip back, and I think maybe that's the best way to do that.

17

I night observe parenthetically that the

18

Constitutional issues that you've raised and your memorandum

19

sent to the Court, I think some tine after, or about the

20

tine of the earlier sentencing date, were, I thought,

21

pertinent, but t h e y — t h o s e same issues were not raised at

22

the time of trial.

23

And I don't mean to belabor that point.

24

the Court did have the motion at that time under advisement

25

and so I think they were appropriate, but I have concluded

10

Even so,

1

2

as I state" her a a ^ w
J

minutes ago.

Is there anything that you or Mr. Carlsen would
like to tell the Court further relative, more directly to
t;Le facts of the offense or the off one*- Itself, before

5

I jentence is imposed?

6

7

MR. HULT:

J u s t — j u s t a few things, your Honor,

and I f m not sure if the Court would feel that they're

8 J exactly approposz but Mr. Carlsen called ne some tine ago
9

a n d — t o let me know that this kid that the police had used

10 I and we felt that it was in the nature of entrapment,
11

regularly sits at a local restaurant here called Angle*s

12

with older friends of his, smokes cigarettes, pals around

13

with them, a n d — a n d appears

14

kids.

15
16

~o he one of an older set of

i*n& he really felt that he was taken advantage
of by the appearance of t h e — o f the

17 I :.nd

v

o y on this occasion,

ho does want the Court to >now that he has novor had

18

any prior convictions, either for this particular offense,

19

nor for any criminal offenses of any nature.

20 I

T H E COURT:

All right.

Thank you*

21

Mr. Carlsen, you 1 re entitled under the statute to

22

add anything you would like to what Mr. Ilult has told the

23

Court.

24

able spokesman and an articulate spokesman in your lawyer.

25

You 1 re not required to, of course, and you have an

is there anything you do want to add?

11

1

;iR. CARL 2 mi:

Nothing other than what he said,

2

that I did really think the toy was plenty of age, you

3

know, when 1 sold those cijarettes.

4

to sell to a rainor.

5

I've always avo: I^d trying to sell to

rainors.

6

THE COURT;

7

MR. CARLCCN;

8

THE COURT:

9

I didn't lo it to try

All right.

I appreciate that-

That's all I have to say.
Mr, Carlson, the Court sentences you

then on the offence of selling tobacco to a ninor to pay a

10

$300 fine and serve 30 days in the jail at Logan, but

11

places you on 12 months informal p r o b a t i o n — w e l l , I'll make

12

it six months infernal probation to the Court.

13

a hundred dollars of your fine ami suspends all of the jail

14

time, if you complete the probation satisfactorily, the

15

conditions of which are that you pay the fine balance, and

16

that includes the State assessnent, I'm not adding it

17

separately, of 0200, that you

1

general, minor traffic charges

8

19

t

And suspends

e a law-abiding person in
lon't count against that,

but other Federal and State and local laws would.

20

And specifically that you don't sell tobacco to

21

underage people as a specific condition of probation, and

22

those are all of the conditions of probation and sentence.

23

Now, I don't know, !Ir. Ilult, whether we need to

24

talk about his ability to pay that or the convenience of

25

paying it or whether he needs an extension, or whether we

12

1

should l i s t e n t o zhz tape f i r s t and i n t e r l i n e w h e t h e r he

2

w a i v e d , a t t h e time of t h e t r i a l , t h e 30-^ay p r o v i s i o n .

3

What i s your p r e f e r e n c e about

4

5

Ma. CAELCISJ:

that?

I t d o e s n ' t m a t t e r t o me.

I haven't

got a checkbook now, b u t I could pay i t .

6

THE COURT:

W e l l , i f you pay i t ,

I 1 1 1 ask t h e

7

c l e r k t o held i t i n t r u s t , and t h e n we 1 11 apply i t t o a

8

sentence i f the motion's denied.

9

i t 1 1 1 be r e t u r n e d t o you.

If t h e m o t i o n ' s

granted,

I s t h a t okay?

10

MR. C7JXCEK:

11

TEL COURT;

12

MR. CATLSTA1: I ' l l have t o r e t my checkbook b e f o r e

13

All r i g h t .

THE COURT;
Tuesday?

HR. CABL32N:

17 J

T H E COURT;

Sure.

Grant you until

tomorrow to pay that int^ the clerk
MH. GVRL3EII:

20

T H E COURT:

22
23

W e ' l l g r a n t you, w h a t ' s

today?

Oh, y e s .

19 I

21

And v e - -

You could have i t done by tomorrow a f t e r n o o n ?

16

18

fine.

i could pay i t .

14
15

That's

1.00 ?.n.

then

and—

Just pay that flown here?
Yes.

At the clerk's counter there in

the foyer, a n d — t h a n k you.
I'm not sure the best way to do that.

It may be

that I'd have time to listen to that tape if the clerk can

24 I provide facilities before I 90 back to Layton, because I
25 I ^0 have a calendar back there.

And I understand you have

13

1

to 1eave for ' L-* A ^—

2

1:30 arraignment, 30

4

THZ COURT:

5

MR. I1ULT:

6

THE COURT:

•

*

•

Oh,
Too bad we can1 t share rides.
Yes.

2ut let me try to do that .

MR. HULT:

*
It should be at the very end, I ,/ould

imagine.

10

THE COUHT:

We'll go to the end, hack it up and

11

see what happened in that colloquy there, and then I can

12

make a decision and notify you and the prosecutor.

13

right.

All

14

MR. UULT;

15

THE COURT:

16

(Whereupon, this sentencing was concluded.)

v?e appreciate that.
Thank you very much.

17
18
19

I 1 11

try and get hold of the tape and listen to it.

8
9

CijL C u .

I 1 * going down to Layton in fact for a

!!?..

3

7

vG

w« C*. -*.

* * *

20
21
22
23
24
25
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